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ral histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewees own words.
Dr. Marion L. Williams was MORS
President from 1982 to 1983 andwas elected
a MORS Fellow and selected as the Wanner
Laureate in 1991. Dr.Williamswas the Chief
Scientist and Technical Director, Headquar-
ters Air Force Operational Test and Evalua-
tion Center (AFOTEC), Kirtland Air Force
Base (AFB), New Mexico, from 1974 until
2005. This interview was conducted on
May 1, 2002 in Dr. Williamss office at Head-
quarters, AFOTEC, and June 13, 2012 at the
US Air Force Academy.
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Greg Keethler: Tell us where you were
born, raised, and educated?
Marion Williams: I was born and
attended public schools in Abilene, Texas.
Greg Keethler: What are your parents
names and howmight they have influenced
your academic or professional directions?
MarionWilliams:Myparents were Lester
and Faye Williams. Although both were
strong influences in that they encouraged
me to ‘‘do my best,’’ they left the definition
of what was best strictly up to me. The ad-
vice from my father I remember the most
was on helping others. He repeatedly told
me that if someone around me was work-
ing, always offer to help—at least dont
stand around with your hands in your
pockets. Probably more influence on the ac-
ademic side came from my paternal grand-
father. Hewas superintendent of schools for
the county in Texas where we lived, and the
most educated man in our family. Like my
father, he wasnt particular about the type
of education, just that we got it.
Greg Keethler: Did you take an early in-
terest in math and science in high school?
Marion Williams: Both math and sci-
ence were of interest. Engineering was al-
ways my intended career, although I dont
remember when or why that decision was
made, and I dont recall anyone even sug-
gesting it. Nothing else was seriously con-
sidered, except for a short time in high
school when I wanted to be an FBI agent.
I went to the local FBI office, introducedmy-
self to the only agent there, and asked if he
could help me learn what an agent did. He
explained the job, and even took me with
him on minor investigations. However,
when he explained that I had to get a degree
in accounting or law, I quickly lost interest. I
just wanted to carry a gun and chase bad
guys.
Greg Keethler: Where did you complete
your undergraduate degree?
Marion Williams: I graduated from
Texas A&MUniversity in aeronautical engi-
neering. My specialty was aerodynamics.
Greg Keethler:Were you in Air Force Re-
serve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in col-
lege or did you go through Officer Training
School (OTS) for commissioning?
MarionWilliams:Like engineering, ROTC
and Texas A&M were other automatic deci-
sions, since I had hopes of becoming a test
pilot. But if not, then I could design air-
planes for other test pilots to fly. My hero
was Chuck Yeager, the first person to break
the sound barrier. During my senior year in
college, I had an opportunity to meet him at
Edwards AFB, California, during ROTC
summer camp.
Greg Keethler:How did you choose your
undergraduate major in aero?
MarionWilliams: Before high school, my
primary goal was to be a test pilot. That
mapped my planned career of engineering,
military service and then test pilot in the
military or industry. Aeronautical engineer-
ing was the natural field for that job. In my
sophomore year in high school, I received
one of the major disappointments of my
young life—I had to start wearing glasses.
My career as a test pilot was ruined before
it even started. I was heavily into the Civil
Air Patrol (CAP) at that time andwas chosen
for a trip to Denmark as an exchange cadet.
The CAP leader andmyhigh school teachers
encouraged me to stay in aeronautical engi-
neering, with a hope that the Air Force
would waive the 20/20 eyesight require-
ment by the time I was out of college.
Because of my interest in aero engineer-
ing, after graduation from A&M in 1956, I
accepted a job at Sandia Laboratory in Albu-
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at their supersonic wind tunnel facility. Primarily,
I was testing nuclear weapon shapes and doing
some wind tunnel and instrumentation design.
My main reason for choosing Sandia was that
one of the nations experts in aerodynamics, Alan
Pope, was to be my boss. He wrote the book on
wind tunnel testing (Wind-Tunnel Testing, 1954).
After a few months at Sandia, I was called to ac-
tive duty as an Air Force second lieutenant at the
Air Force Special Weapons Center (AFSWC),
now the Air Force Weapons Laboratory.
Greg Keethler:What was your Air Force offi-
cer career field?
Marion Williams: My Air Force career was
as a weapon systems engineer. It was more of
an engineering management job than anything
else.
Greg Keethler: What weapons programs did
you work on at AFSWC and what impact did
you have? Where was AFSWC located?
Marion Williams: The Special Weapons Cen-
ter was at Kirtland AFB, NewMexico. My job as
a weapon systems engineer was to oversee inte-
gration of a nuclear warhead into the TM-76
Matador missile. We had electrical andmechan-
ical engineers in the Air Force and at the Glen
L. Martin Company doing the technical work;
I was more of an engineering project manager.
We did the initial fit check of the warhead,
which was developed by Sandia Laboratory
and Los Alamos Laboratory, into the Matador
at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. It
wasnt a very good experience. We found that
the warhead simply didnt fit; we didnt have
computer-aided design (CAD) at the time, and
somewhere along the line, the dimensions
didnt match. I had borrowed an inert warhead
from Sandia for the fit check, and accompanied
it to Holloman AFB, New Mexico, for transport
to White Sands Missile Range. We couldnt get
the warhead to fit in the warhead compartment.
The return trip to Kirtland was as much fun as
the fit check. I had to wait on the runway at
Holloman with the warhead for several hours
until the airplane showed up; and I couldnt
leave for coffee or any other essential functions.
Then we had problems tying the warhead into
the cargo airplane on the return trip. It broke
loose and caught my hand between the war-
head and airplane bulkhead. When we got
back to Kirtland I was ready to get rid of the
thing and go home. I turned it over to the base,
got my hand receipt and left. The next week I
received a call from Sandia wanting their war-
head back; they claimed it was never received
and I couldnt find my receipt. I could see my
Air Force career ending with a court martial
for losing a top secret nuclear warhead. Fortu-
nately, the warhead turned up, so a court mar-
tial wasnt necessary.
Greg Keethler: Did you learn anything valu-
able from your active duty time that was useful
later on in your career?
Marion Williams: There was nothing in par-
ticular; but a tour in themilitary is always useful
in shoving a young lieutenant into the thick of
engineering, which helps build confidence. My
plan was to remain in the Air Force as a career,
but it didnt seem right to be in the Air Force
and not be a pilot. In one of our career encourage-
ment opportunities, General Bernard Schriever,
the Commander of the Air Force Systems Com-
mand, asked whether I was going to stay in the
Air Force. I explained that pilots seemed to get
the best jobs, and if I couldnt get one of the best
jobs, I would probably get out.
After three years in the Air Force, I returned
to Sandia National Laboratory in 1959. Then in
1961, to broaden my experience outside of aero-
dynamics, I went towork for the NavalWeapons
Evaluation Facility (NWEF), also in Albuquer-
que, as a weapons system engineer. Then my
goal changed from aeronautical engineering to
operations research (OR), so I left NWEF in
1966 and took a job with the Joint Chiefs of
Staffs (JCSs) Joint Task Force II (JTF II), my first
real OR job.
Greg Keethler: What led you into OR? How
did that happen?
Marion Williams: It was sort of evolutionary.
When I was at Sandia I was working on aerody-
namics, looking at a small piece of the problem.
But I didnt know how a weapon coefficient of
drag contributed to the overall problem—how
it affected accomplishing the mission. I kept
thinking that there has got to be something big-
ger than this, and during that time OR was just
coming back into vogue. DuringWorld War II it
was a big area, but then it seemed like it went
away; at least I wasnt aware of it as a career
field.
Greg Keethler: That was in the late 1950s?
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MarionWilliams: That was in the early 1960s
when I started doing some reading on OR and
thinking that it would be great to get into that
field. When I was still at Sandia, I read an article
about Chance Vought Aircraft putting together
an OR organization to help design aircraft and
weapons. The article discussed OR techniques
and some of the operations analysis conducted
during WWII. I went to Chance Vought to talk
to their OR group, and started reading OR text-
books. It was then I found out that Sandia had
a very small OR group, so I talked to the director
there to see if I could switch from aerodynamics
into OR. He said I could do that, but I needed to
understand that everyone in the organization
would have a PhD but me; at that time I only
had a bachelors degree. He said there would
be some challenges there. I thought the chal-
lenges were too great, so I didnt move, but
did keep thinking about OR. However, OR
wasmore of a hobby forme until I went to JTF II.
JTF II was a new technically based organiza-
tion headed by then-Maj Gen George Brown,
who later became the Air Force Chief of Staff,
with aNavyRearAdmiral deputy and anumber
of high-level military officers and civilians. JTF
II was established because we didnt under-
stand the ability of aircraft to survive when fly-
ing at low altitudes: How low can airplanes fly?
Whats the effect of multipath and clutter on ra-
dar tracking? Can airplanes effectively and
safely penetrate at low altitude? It was a whole
area—offensive and defensive—that we didnt
understand and couldnt predict.
Greg Keethler:What was the focus of the JTF
IIs work?
Marion Williams: It was focused on fighters,
bombers, missiles—anything at low altitude. It
even extended into medium altitude as well.
But it was primarily an engineering/scien-
tific/testing organization investigating effects
such as multipath, clutter, radar scintillation,
and human factors that affected low-altitude
penetration.
JTF II was based at Kirtland AFB, and we
did really large-scale field testing. We used
Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas for our test
range. We did penetration, low-altitude radar
tracking, all kinds of different types of tests
of weapon effectiveness and survivability. We
had a series of tests planned over a 10-year
period, with a bunch of top-notch statisticians
from Sandia Laboratory to help do the test de-
sign and statistical analyses. We were really
one of the first simulation-based organizations.
We did a lot of hardware and computer simula-
tion at that time, even in the late 1960s. The tech-
nically based part ran the organization—what
we did and how we did things. It was a lot of
fun and an ideal job. Youwalked in the office ev-
ery morning saying. ‘‘It just cant get better than
this.’’Weworkedwith the top statisticians in the
country, and had the freedom to talk with ex-
perts, do research, take courses, and just figure
out how you do a better job of testing, simula-
tion, and statistics. It was great.
JTF II was one of the first organizations to
effectively combine test and evaluation (T&E)
with modeling and simulation (M&S).
Greg Keethler: You had been dissuaded from
pursuing an OR position at Sandia because of
the high level of education of the people there.
Did you have a hard time getting into this OR
analyst position?
MarionWilliams:Not really. Theywere look-
ing for people in OR, but also wanted people
with an engineering background. Because of
the shortage of trained OR analysts they were
taking on engineers, even guys like me, to be
trained as OR analysts.
Greg Keethler: Even Aggies.
Marion Williams: Even Aggies. At that time
it was fairly easy to get into OR, and then get
trained in OR techniques. There was a Navy
Commander named Charlie Luff, who came
from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
where he studied OR. My agreement with him
was that if I went to work at JTF II, he would
mentor me in OR.
Greg Keethler: So he was your mentor?
Marion Williams:He was mymentor, and he
is still in Albuquerque, retired from the Navy.
He is probably still working. He was the first
person who helped train me in OR. I didnt un-
derstand all of it. I had done some reading but
didnt have any formal education.
The main customers of JTF II products were
in industry, where people used our models and
data for weapon systems engineering and evalu-
ation, and in weapons system employment plan-
ning. However, they werent paying customers,
and its a bad situation when the customer
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doesnt put the money into the product. All the
funding came from the Department of Defense
(DoD), and it was an expensive operation. Our
budget at that time was on the order of $50–$60
million a year. In those days, that was a lot of
money. But then therewas a change in emphasis—
either intentional or unintentional—from evalua-
tion of ‘‘low-altitude penetration’’ to evaluation
of Service weapon systems. We didnt last very
long after that due to pressure from the Services;
they didnt like the idea of a JCS organization be-
coming involved in testing of their new systems.
JTF II was disestablished in 1968.
Greg Keethler: What were the greatest diffi-
culties you faced back in your early days at
JTF II? What was the equipment like?
Marion Williams: It was different. I recall I
had this huge piece of equipment on my desk
that was maybe 18 inches wide and two feet
deep, and the most complex thing it could do
was calculate square roots. It cost about $4,000.
Most calculations were done by hand. It was
computationally intensive. When I worked at
Sandia in aerodynamics, calculations were done
with paper spreadsheets, hand calculations,
and a lot of double-checking. More than once,
I had to go back and do an experiment again be-
cause I made a mistake in a calculation. But that
was theworst part of it. Themost funwas trying
to apply theories to real data, to see where
things really worked like the theories said, or
things didnt work like the theories said. There
were some pretty good working simulations at
the time, even with hand computations.
Greg Keethler: Were there any problems in
acceptance of the results by the decisionmakers,
who didnt necessarily understand all these
things?
Marion Williams: To be honest, that hasnt
changed a lot over the years. The presentation
is probably still as important as the basis for
your analysis. If you cant get the point you
are trying to make across, the analysis doesnt
matter. But I think that we had more data at that
time to make a specific point. At JTF II, if you
wanted to know how low you could fly, we
had real test data, with different airplanes, dif-
ferent pilots, experimental designs, with learn-
ing factors included. We could understand
low-altitude flying and understand which fac-
tors had an effect.We started offwith a statistical
test design. We had to define our regression
equation, define the factors, and define factor
levels. We had to randomize the tests so they
werent biased. We would even randomly pick
the next pilot to fly. Mathematical purity was
a goal.
Greg Keethler: Some sort of factorial design?
MarionWilliams:Yes, and fractional factorial
designs. All those things were there, and you
had some good theoretical guys to help out.
We had some good tests wherewe could control
the factors. We also had the money for instru-
mentation. With control and instrumentation,
you can understand what happens and why it
happens. An advantage then that we may not
have now is that we dont have as much control
because we dont have as much funding today.
Greg Keethler:Do you consider your work at
JTF II your most important work in the early
days?
Marion Williams: It was probably the most
important from the standpoint of doing experi-
mentation with the ability to really control test
variables—the scientific approach to testing. I
dont want to say it was the most important
work; operational test and evaluation (OT&E)
has the most impact. JTF II was a better training
ground.
JTF II was a stimulating organization, and
was beginning to evolve into a joint operational
test organization when it was disestablished
and I transferred to theDefenseNuclear Agency
(DNA), also at Kirtland AFB, doing nuclear
weapon reliability assessment.
Greg Keethler: For the nuclear weapon reli-
ability assessments you did for DNA, were
those largely theoretical or based on empirical
studies?
Marion Williams: It was both. There are few
opportunities to fully test a nuclear warhead—
usually one or none. Reliability was based on
combining lots of subcomponent and com-
ponent tests with a very few system tests; to
include detonation of the nonnuclear compo-
nents, and maybe one underground test of the
nuclear device itself. Combining component
and system data provided an approximation
of whether it wouldwork as intended, but there
was no theoretical way to give more credence,
or weight, to system data over component data.
Bayesian statistics provided a way of combining
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data at different levels to get an assessment of
reliability—the probability that the system will
detonate at its full nuclear yield when triggered
by a fuze. There were two schools of thought
in reliability assessment: the classical approach
and the Bayesian approach. Unfortunately, even
the basic concept of confidence levels has a differ-
ent meaning in each camp, and technical discus-
sions become emotional very quickly.
At DNA I was applying Bayesian statistics
to nuclear weapon reliability evaluation, which
was fun. With JTF II, I had worked with a num-
ber of classical statisticians; but the emphasis
in nuclear weapon reliability at that time was
on Bayesian statistics. There are fundamental
differences between classical statisticians and
Bayesian statisticians.
Greg Keethler: There are always arguments
with the Bayesian guys.
Marion Williams: Oh yes. Engineers make
good Bayesians; classical statisticians dont make
good Bayesians.
Greg Keethler: Philosophically speaking and
practically speaking, how do you view the ap-
plicability of Bayesian vs. classical statistics in
the T&E community?
Marion Williams: With my limited experi-
ence in both, I viewed Bayesian as an engineer-
ing approach to statistics and classical statistics
as a mathematical approach. Bayes’ theory gave
a way to combine data at different levels,
weighting system data more than component
data, which seemed to make sense, although
the weighting scheme was somewhat built-in
rather than controlled. The Bayesian approach
requires a prior distribution—a representation
of a belief about reliability before getting any
data. The initial prior is usually a uniformdistri-
bution, representing equally likely values. One
of my classical statistician friends, Dr. Richard
Prairie of Sandia Laboratory, demonstrated
mathematically that a uniform prior introduces
a bias in the answer. That fueled the debate, but
didnt help convince either side.
Greg Keethler: How do you argue for
Bayesian approaches when talking to a ‘‘non-
believer’’?
Marion Williams: I never found a good way
to do that. We had several meetings between
Bayesians and Classicals trying to find a com-
mon ground.We just argued and never resolved
our differences. Those same arguments proba-
bly still go on.
I enjoyed statistics, but kept thinking about
OR. Statistics is a basic skill in OR, and I consid-
ered pursuing advanced degrees in math and
statistics, sincemany of the people I hadworked
with at Sandia were world-class statisticians—-
George Steck, Dick Prairie, and a number of
others. Still, OR was my career of choice. I had
worked part time to get a masters degree in en-
gineering, but the local university didnt offer
a degree in OR. So I went back to school to get
a doctorate in OR at Oklahoma State University
(OSU).
Greg Keethler: Sponsored by the govern-
ment?
Marion Williams: Yes. It was one of those re-
ally good deals. I was in the DNA where there
was a lot of work in the mathematics of reliabil-
ity, and they saw a need for more education. So I
talked them into letting me go back to school for
one year.
Greg Keethler: One year? Thats all?
Marion Williams: One year—thats all the
time they could afford; anything beyond that
was on my own. I did all the course work on
campus in a year, and then did the dissertation
in Albuquerque applied to the work I was doing
at DNA. So it worked out pretty well.
Greg Keethler: That was at Oklahoma State
University?
MarionWilliams:OSU inStillwater,Oklahoma.
The reason I went to OSU was that several stat-
isticians I worked with at Sandia Laboratory
studied there. OSU was an applied engineering
school. I visited OSU, talked to the professors
and explained my interests. I was impressed,
and they accepted me as a doctoral candidate.
My only question was how long it would take.
Theywould never giveme a direct answer. ‘‘Just
enroll and we will see how well you do.’’
Greg Keethler: You mentioned a masters de-
gree. Did you complete that before you started
on the PhD program?
Marion Williams: Yes. I went to night school
part-time for six years to get a masters degree
at the University of New Mexico (UNM) in me-
chanical engineering. OR wasnt offered at
UNM, and neither were aerodynamics or aero-
nautical engineering advanced degrees, so the
nearest thing was mechanical engineering.
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Greg Keethler: What was your dissertation
topic at OSU? How was it related to your work
at the time?
Marion Williams: My primary interest at
OSU was mathematical programming, linear
programming, dynamic programming, etc., as
an approach to optimization. My dissertation
was on a technique called ‘‘recursive search dy-
namic programming,’’ a method for mathemat-
ical optimization. My only application of that
technique was in a trade-off analysis between
nuclear hardening and bomber dispersal, com-
pleted when I was on Air Force reserve duty,
which probably never saw the light of day.
I went back to work at DNA in 1970. How-
ever, I still had a desire to get more into OR. Af-
ter a few years doing nuclear weapon reliability
assessment, Charlie Jacobs, a friend from JTF II
who had worked for the Air Force in OR, called
me and suggested that I consider an OR job as
principal scientist at the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Technical
Center (STC) in The Hague, Netherlands. It
was particularly attractive since it was an op-
erations research position in an international
organization.
It was an Air Force position assigned to
SHAPE. At that time, OR was strong in the
Air Force. There was a civilian organization in
the Pentagon—before Air Force Studies and
Analysis—heavy in OR studies named the Air
Force Operations Analysis (their office symbol
was AFGOA). It had guys like Clay Thomas,
who was an icon for Air Force OR. At that time,
ORwas almost a cliquewithin the Air Force and
really hard to get into. There was an Air Force
Colonel in the Pentagon, Colonel Calafato,
who was the key. If he OKd you, you could
get into OR anywhere in the Air Force; if he
didnt, you were dead in the water.
Greg Keethler:Muchmore centralized than it
is now?
Marion Williams: Oh, much more so—or at
least that was my perception. The group in the
Pentagon seemed to be the center of Air Force
OR. There were also OR organizations at Tacti-
cal Air Command (TAC) Headquarters (HQ),
Strategic Air Command (SAC) HQ, Nellis
AFB, Eglin AFB, United States Air Forces in
Europe (USAFE), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF),
and many other key commands. There was an
OR network within the Air Force. Cooperation
among those OR organizations was outstand-
ing; at least thats the way it looked to those of
us on the outside.
Greg Keethler: And this guy controlled all of
that?
Marion Williams: Colonel Calafato seemed
to be the ‘‘keeper of the keys’’ for civilians to
get in those organizations. I went to Washing-
ton, DC, and talked to him. We got along pretty
well. I applied for the job at STC and was ac-
cepted. My boss at DNA agreed that it was
a job I couldnt afford to turn down, so my wife,
two daughters, and I moved to The Hague,
Netherlands, in 1971.
STC was an international organization with
about 100 scientists from the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. The
Air Force provided about 15 US civilian slots.
You worked for the Air Force on loan to SHAPE
for a three-year period.
Greg Keethler: They still do that?
Marion Williams: Yes, except now they dont
work for the Air Force. They work directly for
SHAPE. You are paid a NATO salary, and you
get benefits such as paying no income tax.When
I was there you paid all the US income taxes.
Greg Keethler: So you were not part of the
civil service when you worked for them?
Marion Williams: We were still US govern-
ment employees. NATO paid the Air Force,
the Air Force paid us. We were assigned to the
American Embassy in The Hague, so we had
Post Exchange (PX) privileges in Europe, and
our kids went to the American schools there.
There were a lot of benefits.
Greg Keethler: What was one of your most
memorable projects or experiences while you
were at STC?
Marion Williams:Most of the work involved
studies using computer models. I did one study
for the British and Dutch on attack of airfields;
looking at the tactics that would be effective and
also ensure survivability of the aircraft—factors
like speed, altitude, electronic countermeasures
(ECM), and so forth. That becamevery interesting
because the US Air Force believed in ECM, but
the British pilots werent so sure. We were brief-
ing a group of British and Dutch pilots on the
study results, showing predictions of surviv-
ability. I explained that the analysis showed that
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they should fly at medium altitude and trust
their ECM. One British pilot commented that
he would prefer to fly at low altitude and trust
his luck.
Greg Keethler: How long were you at STC,
and what did you do following that?
Marion Williams: I went over in 1971, came
back in 1974—a three-year tour. STC wasnt
someplace where you stayed for a career. They
wanted people to come in, do three years, and
then go back to their own organizations.
Thememorable experiences were just living
in Holland. We lived on the economy, had
Dutch, German, English, and American friends,
enjoyed the food and travel, as well as the nor-
mal Dutch living with weekly visits from the
flower man, bread man, chicken man, etc.
When it came time to return to the US, my
old job was gone. The DNA reliability office
had been abolished while I was in Europe, so I
had to find another job. I had an offer to return
to Sandia Laboratory, so that was initially my
first choice.
Greg Keethler: Now you could ‘‘fit in’’ at the
Sandia OR Group, because you had completed
your PhD?
Marion Williams: Yes, I thought I could com-
pete with the other PhDs. However, as I started
moving back to Albuquerque to work for San-
dia, I got a letter from the Air Force saying,
‘‘By the way, the Air Force sent you to Europe
and brought you back, so you owe the Air Force
one more year.’’ There was no way to get out of
that, so Iwent to the newly establishedAir Force
Test and Evaluation Center (AFTEC,which later
became theAir ForceOperational Test and Eval-
uation Center [AFOTEC] in 1983) at Kirtland
AFB. AFTEC and the Office of Aerospace Stud-
ies at Kirtland had openings. I decided to go to
work for AFTEC for a year, then I figured I could
still go back to Sandia.
Greg Keethler: Who was the Commander of
AFTEC then?
Marion Williams:Maj Gen Richard Cross. Lt
Gen John Burns, the first AFTEC Commander,
had just left.
I planned to stay for a year but found that it
was a lot like JTF II. a fairly small organization
with a newmission. The planwas to grow to 208
people, with six or seven OR analysts. It grew
way beyond those expectations. It was a lot like
JTF II in that it was new, exciting, innovative,
and a lot of fun. So I never went back to Sandia.
Greg Keethler: Were you brought in as a line
analyst, or were you in charge of other analysts?
MarionWilliams: I was a line analyst, a GS-14.
Greg Keethler: Who was in charge?
Marion Williams: Colonel Bobby Dunagan
was the head of the operations analysis (OA) di-
rectorate at AFTEC. One of his rules was he
didnt see any need for a computer at AFTEC be-
cause we could do what we had to do with slide
rules and hand calculators. He changed his
mind later on and we used computers, of
course. But he was the first colonel in charge
of analysis.
Greg Keethler: Was there anything particu-
larly relevant from your education, either bach-
elors or masters, and ultimately your PhD, that
served you well when you first started doing
OR?
Marion Williams: I think that statistics really
helped. Mathematical programming and opti-
mization theory also helped. Probably as much
as anything was the way you thought about
a problem—decomposing it and providing
a structure. In testing we do that through def-
inition of issues, objectives, and measures of
effectiveness (MOEs). The structured thinking
helped a lot.
Greg Keethler: Give us your perspective on
statistical design of experiments. In your experi-
ence, which kinds of designs work best for
which applications?
Marion Williams:My dyed-in-the-wool clas-
sical friend at Sandia, Dick Prairie, was an ex-
pert in experimental design, and had forgiven
me for my Bayesian transgressions, so I asked
him to give a course in design of experiments
(DOE) for AFOTEC analysts. It was a practical
approach to experimental design, with hands-
on problem solving. Operational testing ismuch
more complex than the controlled conditions of
most analysis problems, although the principles
directly apply. Our vision was to turn opera-
tional field testing into a controlled experiment;
much like the testing we accomplished during
my time at JTF II, where we had 50 or so Sandia
engineers and statisticians supporting test de-
sign and analysis of large-scale tests to better un-
derstand low-altitude penetration tactics from
both an offensive and defensive standpoint.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. MARION L. WILLIAMS, FS
Military Operations Research, V19 N3 2014 Page 73
Although wemade good strides in applying the
theory to field testing, as the designmoved from
the test planners to the test executors, the influ-
ence of test design seemed to get lost in the prac-
tical constraints and limitations of field tests. It
worked well in controlled tests using hybrid
simulation; it worked less well in tests where
operators and tactical decision makers made
on-the-spot decisions based on somewhat ran-
dom events. I have since learned that I needed
to know more about complexity theory.
Greg Keethler: When have you successfully
used full factorial, fractional factorial, central
composite designs, Latin squares, etc.? And con-
versely, which ones have you seen fail miserably
in which applications?
Marion Williams: Full factorial was seldom
a choice except in simple tests, so fractional fac-
torial was the design of choice. There were few
catastrophic failures or blazing successes in ei-
ther case, although fractional factorial design
had the problem of confounding, so some inter-
actions were not accounted for; and we never
knew for sure when it made a difference.
Greg Keethler: It seems like most of the peo-
ple you worked with at JTF II and at AFOTEC
were very quantitatively oriented. What were
their backgrounds?
Marion Williams: Primarily engineers and
mathematicians. There were very few OR ana-
lysts. I think when AFTEC first started, there
were six or seven analysts and a director. It
didnt take long to grow to 30 or so analysts; still
mostly engineers with OR titles. There were
four analysis divisions. Each division had five
or six people, so we had 20 to 30 people in the
directorate, with Bobby Dunagan as the direc-
tor. One of the reasons for getting into OR was
a need for people in those fields—and it contin-
ued to grow. Later AFOTEC had about 100 ana-
lysts in the directorate.
Greg Keethler: There were some significant
organizational evolutions in AFOTEC and Im
sure you had a big hand in those because of your
position. Could you talk about how you had to
alter the organization as the demands of the
Air Force grew?
Marion Williams: When AFOTEC was cre-
ated, the head of the Operations Analysis Direc-
torate thought that six analysts would be plenty.
Maybe a dozen at the most, because all they had
to dowas tell the test team howmany times they
needed to run a test. And there was probably no
need for a computer. As the number of test pro-
grams grew, we found that testing is a com-
plicated process. With time, the number of
analysts grew and we even bought a computer.
Greg Keethler: That was SA—systems analysis.
MarionWilliams:Yes, with about 100 people.
Later we established another analysis organiza-
tion doing the logistics evaluation. Initially they
were a part of the analysis organization, but
thenwe split that off into the LG (logistics) organi-
zation; also about 100 people addressing suitabil-
ity. They did a lot of modeling using component
test information and the series/parallel rela-
tionships. Component data and a reliability
model allowed them to use reliability data and
maintenance data to estimate metrics such as
mean-time-between-failure, mean-time-to-repair,
and sortie rate.
Greg Keethler:Using discrete eventmodeling?
Marion Williams: Yes, thats right.
Greg Keethler: What is that model that the
loggies had?
Marion Williams: Dick Gunkel was the per-
son who brought LCOM—the Logistics Com-
posite Model—to AFOTEC. It was an existing
model in use at several organizations. LCOM
was used to estimate not only sortie rate, but
number of maintenance personnel required,
number of spares required, and other metrics
to help determine the manpower and funding
needed to support the system when it became
operational.
That was a huge effort and that came about
because Lt Gen Howard Leaf, AFOTEC Com-
mander at the time, was very concerned about
logistics. Although we were doing a decent job
of estimating the operational effectiveness of
a systemwhen deployed, wewerent doingwell
in estimating suitability and what it would take
to keep a system operating.
Bob Sheldon: Did the logistics analysts at
AFOTEC address the issue of reliability growth,
where the reliability improves over time?
MarionWilliams:We tried to do assessments
of reliability growth. One of the big problems
was with the LANTIRN (Low Altitude Naviga-
tion and Targeting Infrared for Night) program
with Colonel (later Lt Gen) Jim Fain as the
program manager. He was a very aggressive
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program manager. He initially had a very low
reliability but projected a large growth that
would meet production requirements by the
time it was deployed.We said, ‘‘You can assume
you can run a one-minute mile, but you know
youre not going to get there.’’ [Laughter]
We really didnt know how to project reli-
ability growth; all we had were contractor plans
for improvement with no hard data.
Greg Keethler:We had a team of software an-
alysts in AFOTEC for a while. They did some
analysis that related delays in development to
number of lines of code in software. With Maj
Gen Cliver and Dr. Williams endorsement, we
took that up to the Air Staff. Darleen Druyun
was the person in charge at that time. They
did not want to hear that story.
Marion Williams: Correct. We looked at the
lines of code and analyzed the structure of the
code. How easy is it to maintain? How easy to
change the code? Is the code well documented?
The software evaluation group that worked for
Greg did a great job.
AFOTEC increased the number of analysts
in the Operations Analysis Directorate and in
the Logistics Evaluation Directorate to about
200 analysts—100 in each. Unfortunately, due
to manning and funding cuts, the number of an-
alysts in the Headquarters had been drastically
reduced; the Logistics Directorate and the Soft-
ware Evaluation Group were eliminated.
Greg Keethler: Havent they pushed a lot of
that out to the detachments (dets), now?
Marion Williams: Most of the analysts are
now in the dets; many are contractors.
Greg Keethler: All the dets wanted analysts
out of the headquarters and at the dets, but then
when I went out to the dets and talked to the an-
alysts, they werent doing analysts work.
Marion Williams: They were doing project
management work.
Greg Keethler: And administrative work and
other things. So really itwas a net reduction in an-
alytical capability to push the analysts to the dets.
Marion Williams: Yes. Maj Gen Eichhorn
tried to reverse that and bring analysts back into
Headquarters—building it up as much as he
could.
Greg Keethler: What drove having to set
up the dets rather than do things from the
Headquarters?
Marion Williams: Lt Gen Leaf was the one
who started moving test teams to the detach-
ments because we had testing being conducted
in several locations. Creating dets in different
operating locations increased the efficiency of
those test programs by being located at the test
site. Eventually we had dets in several locations
in the US and one in Germany. The Detachment
Commanders handled care and feeding of the
test teams in their deployed locations.
At one time, the Headquarters wrote the
test plan, then gave it to the dets and theywould
execute the test. Then it would come back to
Headquarters for analysis and report writing.
That has changed over the years until at one
point most of the planning, execution, and anal-
ysis was being done at the det. The analysis pro-
cess has evolved with the evolution of the
analysis organization—from very small to
rather large back to small again.
Greg Keethler: When you were at AFOTEC,
who were the influential actors in military OR
in terms of people or organizations?
Marion Williams: Before Air Force Studies
and Analysis there were two analysis groups
in the Air Force, a civilian and a military group.
As I understand it, those groups were merged
and became the Air Force Studies and Analyses
Agency (AFSAA). I started in OR after Studies
and Analysis was formed. Clay Thomas and
Sylvia Waller were the two I had the most deal-
ings with. Sylvia was the chief scientist at
AFSAA until she retired and Clay took that
job.Weworked on a number of programswhere
AFSAA supported AFOTEC using their com-
puter models. The A-10 was an example. We
did the test; they did the survivability analysis
using our test data. The Advanced Medium-
Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Opera-
tional Utility Evaluation was another. Captain
Greg Keethler was the analyst on that program.
Joint Test and Evaluation had a lot of influ-
ence, and was a lot larger then. A joint test had
about $l00 million in funding over a three-year
period, along with a fairly large number of Air
Force, Army, and Navy personnel. Walt Hollis
was at the Army Operational Test and Evalua-
tion Agency (OTEA) at the time—now called
the Army Test and Evaluation Command
(ATEC). He was the chief scientist/tech director
at OTEA. Lt Gen Glenn Kent had just retired
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from the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
(WSEG) and was working for RAND Corpora-
tion. He was still a major influence in MORS
and in OR. Maj Gen Jasper Welch was the direc-
tor of AFSAA. Wilbur Payne was head of the
Army analysis group at Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC)
at White Sands. We had a lot of cooperation be-
tween AFOTEC, Jasper Welch at AFSAA and
Wilbur Payne at TRAC. There were some major
joint tests on electronic warfare (EW) where the
Army andAir Force analysis organizations sup-
ported the test with a lot of simulation. We had
good cooperation. I think we were less stove-
piped then than we are right now.
Greg Keethler: How about interaction with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Pro-
gram Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)?
Marion Williams:We worked a lot with Tom
Christie who was in PA&E at the time. There
was a time when Christies group at PA&E
had oversight of OT&E. We briefed Tom a num-
ber of times on some of our OT&E programs,
and he often expressed his concern about our
tests and evaluations. The IIR (imaging infra-
red) Maverick missile was one. We had con-
ducted operational testing to demonstrate
system performance, but Tom was concerned
about survivability of the airplane during the
time the pilot was trying to locate and engage
a target; especially in a cluttered battlefield. Tom
insisted that we conduct some additional tests at
Fort Polk, Louisiana, with burning tanks and
IR countermeasures to evaluate whether the en-
emy guns andmissiles could engage the aircraft
while it was trying to attack moving tanks.
PA&E had a strong hand in how we designed
and analyzed tests.
Greg Keethler: What was the most essential
part of your OR background?
MarionWilliams: Just learning that the hard-
est part of any problem is the up-front thinking
to find out the most important elements of any
problem—how to figure out what the driving
factors are in a problem, and how you analyze
them.
Greg Keethler:Howyou learnwhat to ignore.
Marion Williams: Thats right—defining
whats important. Its the same now. The 80/20
rule (Pareto principle) applies: 80 percent of
the problem can be solved with 20 percent of
the effort—if you find the right 20 percent. If
you can find 20 percent of the most important
factors, you can solve 80 percent of the problem.
Greg Keethler:When did you go to your first
MORS Symposium (MORSS)?
MarionWilliams: That was in 1974. I was just
back from the SHAPE Technical Centre and
working for AFTEC. Colonel Bobby Dunagan
encouraged me to attend a MORSS in Fort
Eustis, Virginia.
Greg Keethler: How did you like that first
MORSS?
Marion Williams: I really didnt understand
the organization or the wide range of topics
available in the different groups, but I was
impressed with the variety of working groups.
The technical discussions in theworking groups
really helped me better understand OR applica-
tions. The thing that impressed me most was
having an opportunity to meet famous people
such as Glenn Kent, Jasper Welch, Wilbur
Payne, and the like. Later I also had the chance
to meet others like Walt Hollis and Clay
Thomas. Those were the visionaries; people
whowere too busy to talk to me during normal
office hours but would spend time explaining
policy and politics during MORSS coffee
breaks and dinners. They had the long-term vi-
sion on how the DoD ought to be organized,
what senior leadership wanted to do, how
OR should be applied, and how T&E and OR
could work together.
Greg Keethler: Did you meet any other nota-
ble MORS people at that first MORSS?
Marion Williams: I happened to be standing
at the registration desk and saw the name tag,
Marion Bryson. Having the same first name,
we started talking and I learned that he was
on the Board of Directors for MORS. I asked
him how one could get involved with MORS.
My question really was, ‘‘How do I get a job like
yours?’’ My goal was to be a director; becoming
MORS President wasway beyondmy dreams at
the time. Marion explained that you start with
a working group, then become the chair of
a working group, andwork up from there, help-
ing to organize a committee and finally run
a symposium. So I just started following that
guidance. I started helping with the organiza-
tion, and found it wasmore fun than just attend-
ing. The workers in the MORS office, the Board
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of Directors, and MORSS attendees, are all out-
standing.
Greg Keethler: What was MORSS like back
then?
Marion Williams: A lot more informal, and
a lot smaller. The attendance at the first MORSS
I attended in 1971 was about 600. Later, when
the number of symposia was decreased from
two to one per year (with workshops), the atten-
dance averaged around 1,000.
It was probably not a lot different from to-
day, except for size. There are still the same com-
mon interests and the same enthusiasm for OR.
The unique thing about MORSS is the ability to
conduct classified discussions. The working
groups were essentially peer reviews—analysts
came to discuss their work, discuss the analysis,
and debate their assumptions. Its the interac-
tion between the audience and the speaker that
makes the working groups really interesting.
Greg Keethler: Has any of that changed over
the years?
Marion Williams: Somewhat. It varies with
time. Quite often you get into a lecture where
there is a presentation without much interaction
with the audience. As MORS President, I tried
to have rules to encourage interaction, such as
no more than 20 slides in a briefing with more
time allocated to discussion. The discussion is
the most important part of a working group.
We also encouraged staying in one working
group throughout thewholeMORSS; you didnt
go from group to group. It wasnt required, but
if individuals stayed with one group they got to
know the people in that group. The first day you
met the people, and by the third day you were
arguing and debatingwith them about technical
points. The learning of new techniques and the
interaction among the working group made it
interesting.
Greg Keethler: This phenomenon of every-
body madly flipping through the MORSS pro-
gram, picking out the different working groups
to go to, that was different back then?
Marion Williams: You didnt move from one
working group to another. You stayed with one
group in your specialty. Of course, there were
not thatmanyworking groups; therewere prob-
ably half the number of working groups as now,
so there were fewer selections at that time.
Greg Keethler: But it seemed well organized?
Marion Williams: I thought so. But one of
the reasons we could always justify going to
MORSS was not so much the organization as
the opportunity to talk to Jasper Welch or Maj
Gen George Harrison or Walt Hollis and other
key decision makers. Those were real learning
opportunities with leaders in the business.
Greg Keethler: In addition to the technical dis-
cussions, it was a good networking opportunity.
Marion Williams: Outstanding networking
opportunities. And that is still the case. MORSS
still is the place to go tomeet people in your field.
It was a place to get free advice, talk to people,
get ideas, or solve problems. It was very benefi-
cial and still is. All of this is in addition to expo-
sure to new methods and problem solutions.
Greg Keethler:How did your involvement in
MORS progress?
Marion Williams: It was really standard; I
started off with a working group, first just lis-
tening, then making presentations.
Greg Keethler: Which working group?
Marion Williams: T&E. I had done studies,
M&S, and the like, but OT&E was somewhat
new. Later I became a chair of the working
group, then chair of a composite group, then
chair of one of the organizing committees. My
big opportunity came when Dave Spencer,
MORS President at the time, called to see if I
would be interested in being the program chair
for the 41stMORSS at FortMcNair,Washington,
DC, in June 1978. That was just a fewmonths be-
fore the symposium. The person who was to be
the program chair had resigned. There was a lot
to be done and a short time to get everything or-
ganized, but I didnt want to pass up the oppor-
tunity. It was hectic, but the MORS office and
everyone on the other committees did most of
the work. It was a good experience. I continued
to work on different committees, then was elec-
ted to the Board of Directors. Later I was elected
Vice President, then President—that occurred
at the symposium in Albuquerque in 1982.
According to Jim Bexfield, I was the second
longest-serving MORS President at 15 months
(Bex having been the longest-serving MORS
President at 21 months).
One big problem I had during my presi-
dency occurredwhen theNavy decided towith-
draw their MORS sponsorship, and not send
anyNavy participants to the symposia. The Vice
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Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), ADM
Hays, decidedMORSwas not all that beneficial,
so they were not going to participate. I spent
a lot of time talking to him.
Greg Keethler: What did you tell him?
Marion Williams: I tried to explain all the
benefits for Navy participation in the symposia,
and in having the Navy as a sponsor. Several of
us tried to quantify the benefits of MORS, but it
is hard to show a cost savings due to someone
learning about a new tool or technique at a sym-
posium. However, after a number of conversa-
tions, the Navy VCNO decided to continue
Navy support to MORS.
During the same timeframe, the Army de-
cided that two symposia each year was too
many, while the Air Force still wanted two sym-
posia each year. For a period of about two years
there were continuous changes in the sponsor-
ship and the number of meetings. It was interest-
ing. We also started the mini-symposia (special
meetings) and the workshops to address specific
issues. MORS changed during that time—I think
for the better.
Greg Keethler: What were your MORS posi-
tions before you became President?
Marion Williams: The officer positions were
different from what they are now. I was on the
Board of Directors, then Vice President for Sym-
posium Operations, then President. Being a
member of the Board of Directors and an officer
involves a lot of work, but rewarding work.
Greg Keethler: Once you got involved in
MORS, was there someone mentoring you, or
was it your own initiative as you went along?
Marion Williams: Some of each. It provided
an efficient way to talk to a lot of people about
T&E and M&S at one time, and also do a lot of
coordination on normal business topics. It was
just a great opportunity to learn and get things
done. Plus, the people who ran MORS—Ed
Napier, Dick Wiles, Brian Engler, and of course
Natalie Kelly and the other people in the office,
were always a pleasure to work with.
Greg Keethler: What did MORS do for its
members back then, and howdoes that compare
with today?
Marion Williams: It is at least as good;
maybe better now because the community is
bigger. In some ways the community is more
stove-piped now, even though we try to tear
down the stovepipes and become ‘‘joint.’’
MORS provides away to talk to people fromdif-
ferent organizations, understand what they are
doing, and take advantage of new ideas. There
are a lot of good things in the OR community
if you can just leverage, maybe even plagiarize,
those ideas. One of the major benefits is the op-
portunity to understand what other people are
doing, and take advantage of it.
Greg Keethler: When did MORS start doing
workshops?
Marion Williams: It was during the period I
was President (1982), when we went from two
symposia a year to one symposium a year. I
can remember asking Walt Hollis whether we
could do only one symposium a year, but also
have workshops. Walt said that if we tried to
have a symposium and also a 500-person work-
shop, we would be cheating. However, one
symposium and a small workshop would be
okay. So we started having one MORSS and
one workshop each year, and later went to mul-
tiple workshops.
I think MORS has had some very good
workshops, but we dont always take advantage
of them by fully using the products, such as us-
ing workshop recommendations to improve
DoD analysis. I think simulation validation
(SIMVAL) was one that made a difference. The
attendees at SIMVAL defined the verification,
validation, and accreditation (VV&A) terms
that were later adopted by DoD. Later SIMVAL
workshops defined the elements of VV&A. Al-
though we still havent solved that issue, the
process is better understood.MORS had awork-
shop several years ago called ‘‘How Much Test-
ing Is Enough?’’ It was sponsored by both
MORS and the International Test and Evalua-
tion Association (ITEA). There were some really
good findings from that workshop. There were
some penetrating discussions and good in-
sights. The goal was to try to implement some
of the workshop conclusions, but like many
similar efforts no one has time to follow up.
Greg Keethler:Who should do that? Sponsors?
Marion Williams: It really should be the
organizing committee. But it takes work and it
takes time. Not many people have the time. Al-
though carrying through with workshop rec-
ommendations is not easy, a lot of good things
comeout of them, so it ought tomake adifference.
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Part of the benefits of symposia and workshops
comes from learning from others. But work-
shops designed to address a specific issue
should result in something getting better.
Greg Keethler: Can you think of any things
that MORS did back then that are different from
what we do today?
Marion Williams: We had more intense dis-
cussions then, because of the smaller size of
the organization. As an organization gets big-
ger, the time for discussions and interactions is
reduced. There was also more time at the end of
the day for talking about what we learned, and
for asking penetrating questions.We probably ar-
gued a lotmore then because it was seen as a peer
review and a time to question methods and as-
sumptions. When Maj Gen George Harrison
was head of AFSAA, he insisted that there be
no AFSAA preview of presentations for
MORS since it was a time for discussing work
in progress—not public relations (PR) briefings
on finished products.
Greg Keethler:Do you have any recollections
of things that you look back and laugh about
from your MORS experiences?
Marion Williams: There were some things I
didnt admit for a long time. One was the origin
of SIMVAL—the MORS workshop on VV&A. I
thought it was a successful workshop. M&S
was growing in popularity, but a ‘‘process’’ for
making sure a model is good enough for a spe-
cific application wasnt that well defined. How-
ever, SIMVAL didnt come about because of
a technical need; it came about because of a de-
sire to hold a meeting in Albuquerque during
the Balloon Fiesta—a major event in Albuquer-
que. An unnamed person in the MORS office
had said, ‘‘Marion, we need to come to Albu-
querque during the Balloon Fiesta. Can you
think of some workshop we can hold out
there?’’ I talked to Jim Sikora, and we agreed
that M&S was becoming more important, so
a workshop on VV&A should be able to pro-
duce something worthwhile. And it did. We
had attendees from all of the major study orga-
nizations, as well as Maj Gen George Harrison,
the head of AFSAA. That workshop developed
definitions and elements of VV&A that are still
in use today. However, the workshop came
about because of the Balloon Fiesta. As we were
setting the agenda, I talked to Clay Thomas to
get his advice. He said, ‘‘Marion, keep your
goal high but your expectations low. If you
try to solve all the worlds VV&A issues, you
will be disappointed.’’ That was good advice.
We developed definitions and elements, and
we had general agreement on the product of
the workshop.
Greg Keethler: And theyve stuck.
Marion Williams:And theyve stuck. We had
M&S experts at the workshop from the Services,
RAND, and industry. The Army had a good
start; we just expanded their definitions and
developed the essential elements of VV&A. We
then briefed the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
OSD PA&E, and they adopted those terms. It
is really important to have a common way of
thinking about something like VV&A. MORS
provides a forum for doing that.
Greg Keethler: So the Balloon Fiesta was the
genesis of these breakthroughs.
Marion Williams: Yes, and we did it again at
a Balloon Fiesta a number of years later. We
have had several SIMVAL workshops. We
havent been as successful in getting good ex-
amples of VV&A. We have a good theory; suc-
cessful applications of that theory are harder
to come by.
Greg Keethler: Has MORS been good for the
military OR profession?
Marion Williams: Oh, very much so. I dont
know what we would have done without
MORS. I may have a biased view because of
a long association with MORS, but there is no
way that you can read everything that is being
written about OR. A better way is to attend
MORSS and ask questions, or listen to presen-
tations from DoD leadership and from peer
groups. If I have any criticism, it would be that
we tend to have more lectures than discussions.
MORSS working groups should be for peer re-
view of work in progress, with the briefer want-
ing to improve rather than sell.
Greg Keethler: Looking back on your in-
volvement with MORS over the years, what
stands out? Is it being President, is it SIMVAL,
another workshop?
Marion Williams: I think SIMVAL was a big
part of it, but it was also just meeting the peo-
ple who attended, and the DoD leaders who
came to speak. Where else would you get the
opportunity to talk to the head of the Central
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Intelligence Agency (CIA), Bobby Inman? Or
Gene Woolsey from the Colorado School of
Mines. Gene is a true OR analyst and teacher.
At the time he had small classes devoted to in-
novative OR studies to improve industry and
government applications. His students had to
have passports to go anywhere, anytime. If they
took on a project and saved the client at least
a million dollars, they received a diamond pin.
I think he had lots of studentswith diamondpins
based on OR applications.
It was also possible to spend hours with one
of my heroes—Lt Gen Glenn Kent—discussing
his experiences at AFSAA and theWeapons Sys-
tems Evaluation Group. And meeting these
people at MORS made it much easier to call
on them for assistance or advice on AFOTEC
business matters.
Greg Keethler: What concerns do you have
about the future of MORS?
Marion Williams: Spending too much time
on OR tools rather than the application of those
tools in the context of an analysis.M&S isnt a so-
lution; it is tool to help arrive at a solution.
MORS needs to stress the importance of analy-
sis, and the need to understand that importance.
They need to put more emphasis on thinking
about a problem and deciding what is impor-
tant before trying to solve it. We are getting into
a complex age, where systems have to interact
with other systems. Nothing works by itself
anymore; each system works with other sys-
tems, including off-board sensors and fused
data. Interoperability is critical, yet hard to eval-
uate. The emphasis has to be on how well a sys-
tem can accomplish its mission rather than how
well the equipment performs. Mission-level
evaluation is becoming more important, but
the tools to understand and put threshold
values on mission parameters are never easy –
sometimes not even possible.
Developing analytical tools was an im-
portant topic in MORS. Several years ago, Walt
Hollis asked the question, ‘‘Why is it that the
Services use different engagement models to
address the same problem? The Air Force uses
SUPPRESSOR, the Army uses COMO, and
Navy uses WEBTAC. Each does about the same
thing, but when you use an Army model, the
airplanes all get killed. When you use the Air
Force model, no airplanes get killed. Why cant
we agree on one air defense model?’’ Walt rec-
ommended that MORS help address that issue,
and MORS sponsored the Air Defense Model-
ing and Simulation (ADMAS) workshop. Jim
Bexfield and I cochaired the workshop to ad-
dress that question. The idea was to take differ-
ent applications, use the three Service models,
and figure out which model did the best job.
We had six different study applications: bomber
penetration, air defense, self-protection, and
some others. We tried to trace the MOEs back
to the important factors in the model, and figure
out how themodel treats that phenomenon, and
then whats right and wrong with the model.
The idea was to pick the best model for those
applications—hopefully the same model. How-
ever, before the workshop we were told that
we could not recommend a common model
for the Services. That was probably a good rec-
ommendation, but didnt answer Walts ques-
tion. We assessed all three models, showing
the good and bad parts of each one, and wrote
a report—and nothing changed. The Army still
used COMO (at that time), the Air Force still
uses SUPPRESSOR, the Navy may still use
WEBTAC. The analysis got confounded with
politics; still, it was a good idea.
Many of the MORS workshops addressed
modeling and simulation, which generated con-
siderable interest in the use of M&S to address
testing issues; especially in OT&E. At the time,
the primary guidance in OT&E prohibited the
use of M&S ‘‘as a substitute for testing.’’ At
the same time, there were many issues that
couldnt be addressed with field testing, and
there was also pressure to reduce the cost of
T&E through the use of simulation.
There were numerous sessions between the
Services and OSD on where and how M&S
could and could not be used. One of the key is-
sues in those sessions was model validation –
comparison of model results with real-world
results to make sure the model was accurate.
Validation is a complicated problem that is still
debated within the DoD. TheMORS workshops
that addressed the VV&A issue were a big step
forward because they developed the definitions
and principles. The key concept in model vali-
dation is the comparison of model results with
data. However, getting real data for comparison
isnt easy or cheap; so many organizations
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adopted the use of subject matter experts opin-
ions instead of comparing to physics or experi-
mental data. That is a risky approach, and we
have a long way to go to get it right.
Greg Keethler: Before we go on to the next
section, any other comments you might have
on MORS itself?
Marion Williams: Just the fact that it was a lot
of fun. MORS is a technical and social organiza-
tion. You go there to meet the people, and to
learn. Part of the entertainment at MORSS
was—at one time—formaldinnerswith speakers.
Greg Keethler: How long ago was that?
Marion Williams: Not too many years
ago—the 1980s or early 1990s. I can recall a din-
ner with a speaker on maritime law. It lasted
about two hours. Im not sure why we picked
that topic, but it must have been of interest to
someone. We also had Admiral Inman as
a speaker, which was fascinating. In a chance
meeting with Admiral Inman sometime later,
he mentioned that during his talk at MORS,
Ross Perot was waiting for him in his hotel to
discuss some very current events regarding res-
cuing some personnel. Dinners were very for-
mal and structured. After some years of that,
MORSS dinners became very informal with sea-
food, barbeque, crab, and the like—and no
speaker. That is much better because you can
more easily move around and talk to more peo-
ple. I thought it was Natalies idea, but accord-
ing to Natalies oral history, it was originally
Socky Solomon who started it with an Alabama
pig pickin’ in 1987.
Greg Keethler: Id like to transition now to the
subject ofmilitary OR as a profession. Howdoes
it compare now to what it was like when you
first got into it?
Marion Williams: Tough question. I think at
that time it was more respected as a profession.
That probably isnt the right term, but it was
viewed as a high-level problem-solving activity.
There were formal OR groups in most organiza-
tions, a lot more than exist today. In the Air
Force, there were ‘‘chief scientists’’ at operations
analysis organizations at SAC, TAC, AFOTEC,
and most of the other major organizations. Most
of the Air Force OA offices have been abolished.
We use analysis tools to gain insight and help
draw conclusions, but the tools seem to be the fo-
cus rather than the analysis—and the analysts.
Maybe we focus more on the process than on
the product. Assumptions, approach, and con-
clusions dont seem to be as glaringly obvious
in some studies as they were in the past, or at
least as I remember them. Then again, it may
be the same and my memory is faulty. Still, it
isnt as evident that studies provide the insight
that is needed to make decisions.
Greg Keethler: How does the typical military
ORpractitioner today compare to his or her coun-
terpart back in the early days of the profession?
Marion Williams: Better educated now. I
think that in earlier days we relied as much on
mentors as on education. Current OR education
seems to focus more on the tools than on the art
of problem solving. Much of that has to come
from selected mentors—those with vision and
a sense of the Air Force, or Army, or Navy.
The key was working for or knowing people
with those skills, and the desire to talk about
problems and potential solutions. People like
Jasper Welch, Wilbur Payne, Glenn Kent,
George Harrison, and others too numerous to
name. And people who werent analysts, but
had vision and a sense of the military like Lt
Gen Howard Leaf—one of my favorite people
in the world, and the one who helped me most
in my career.
Greg Keethler: Talk about Lt Gen Leaf. How
did he influence you? How did he influence
the overall T&E community?
Marion Williams: Lt Gen Howard Leaf was
a rare leader. Working for him when he was
AFOTECCommander and thenwhenhewasDi-
rector of Air Force Test and Evaluationwas pure
pleasure. He had all the good leadership qualities
of listening to his people (military or civilian), in-
sight into tough problems, and a reputation that
allowed him access to anyone at any level. He
worked tirelessly to understand an issue, pick
the right people to solve problems, and open
doors to get things done. Any door could be
opened by saying ‘‘General Leaf asked that I
talk to you.’’ He also sought the opinion of
others on important issues: the Air Force Scien-
tific Advisory Board (SAB), the Director of Op-
erational Test and Evaluation (Jack Krings, Phil
Coyle, Tom Christie), individuals such as Lt
Gen (retired) Glenn Kent, Dr. Jacques Gansler,
or any one of several dozen other experts in
their field.
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His insight was evident when we were test-
ing the E-4B. At the time, nuclear effects such as
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) were not consid-
ered part of OT&E. Those issues were left to
the laboratories. However, Lt Gen Leaf was con-
cerned that the E-4B, with its long trailing wire
antenna, could suffer damage in the event of
a high-level EMP, so he asked what we planned
to do as a part of OT&E. I explained that we sim-
ply didnt do nuclear effects analysis; we had no
nuclear effects experts, and it wasnt part of our
mission at AFOTEC. Lt Gen Leaf then carefully
explained to me that it was an operational issue,
and we had to do something about it. I think his
words were something like ‘‘Dammit Marion,
do something!’’We found some nuclear experts,
conducted a short study, and drew conclusions
about survivability of the E-4B to EMP, with rec-
ommendations for additional tests to examine
upset effects — transient effects that cause the
computers to freeze and have to be rebooted.
Lt Gen Leafs insight was correct in that EMP ef-
fects were raised as a concern at the DefenseAd-
visory Board where production decisions were
made. Lt Gen Leaf took along a three-slide brief-
ing we had prepared for him ‘‘just in case.’’ That
short briefing covered the points of concern to
the decision makers.
Later Lt Gen Leaf asked that I work on an
expansion to the AFOTEC mission to include
nuclear effects on new weapon systems. I again
argued that it wasnt in our mission, we didnt
have the right expertise, and the Air Force prob-
ably wouldnt even let us take on that mission.
After another ‘‘Dammit, Marion, do some-
thing!’’ we did a study on nuclear effects evalu-
ation in OT&E. Much to our surprise, it was
enthusiastically approved by the Air Force,
with more people and more funding added to
AFOTEC for the additional tasks. I never again
questioned Lt Gen Leafs insight and judgment.
One of the highlights of my career was
when Maj Gen George Harrison became the
AFOTECCommander in 1993.With Lt Gen Leaf
at AF/TE and Maj Gen Harrison at AFOTEC,
the test and analytical worlds were in harmony.
Maj Gen Harrison would come in on Saturday
mornings and we would draw on the white-
board and discuss technical issues; later briefing
Lt Gen Leaf to get his insight and support. Lt
Gen Leaf would sometimes send us to brief
members of the AF Scientific Advisory Board,
and as many other general officers and senior
leaders as necessary to ensure that we had the
problem correctly defined and a solution that
made sense. When there were still doubts, Lt
Gen Leaf brought in Lt Gen Kent, or Harold
Smith or Jacques Gansler or Norm Augustine
or other well-known technical personalities to
make sure we were on the right track.
Maj Gen Harrison and I had one specific
problem in an area of special interest to Lt Gen
Leaf—electronic warfare. Lt Gen Leaf worried
because we didnt have a way to measure
ECM effectiveness. There were no ‘‘holes in
the ground’’; measurement of ECM effective-
ness was normally ‘‘reduction in lethality’’ or
RIL, whichwas in reality the increase in number
of misses caused by ECM—related to surviv-
ability but not a direct measure of survivability.
If an aircraft was particularity vulnerable to
a threat system, an increase in the number of
misses often still meant an unacceptable proba-
bility of survival. Lt Gen Leaf wanted a more
meaningful measure. Captain Suzanne Beers
(later Col/Dr. Beers) was assigned the job of
building an ‘‘elephant brief’’ to explain the com-
plicated problem of ECM OT&E—from the tale
of the three blind men feeling an elephant, then
each describing it differently. There was a lack
of common understanding of the complexity
of the problem. Suzanne briefed the results of
that effort and we developed an approach for
ECM OT&E using field testing, hybrid simula-
tion, and computer simulation, with a lot of ex-
perimental results to provide data inputs.
However, the M&S required, in addition to
operational testing, to evaluate the survivability
of an aircraft being engaged by an advanced
threat requires not only complicated models,
but also extensive input data, including bistatic
radar signatures. Existing models required ma-
jor upgrades and bistatic radar signature data
that werent available. Years later, Dr. Frank
Gray conducted tests in a hybrid simulation fa-
cility using radar data provided by one of the
Air Force radar laboratories. Unfortunately Lt
Gen Leaf had retired as Director of Test and
Evaluation so we didnt complete the effort in
time to answer his questions.
Another problem was ECM technique ro-
bustness (the impact of changes in individual
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threat systems caused by calibration, alignment,
andmanufacturing tolerances) aswell as counter-
countermeasures. This ‘‘round-to-round’’ varia-
tion sometimes meant that an ECM technique
tested against a threat system on a test range
might or might not work against other threat
systems of the same type on another test range;
the implication being that it might not work in
combat against that type of threat system!
Maj Gen Harrison funded some experi-
ments where we flew an aircraft with an ECM
pod against two threat systems of the same type
at different test ranges—and got different test
results! Although the ECM technique was effec-
tive against the threat system at one range, it
was not effective against the same type of threat
at another range. It was good news in that we
confirmed our theory, but bad news in that we
found an operational problem that had to be
fixed.
The technical approach we thought would
be required was to use computer models of
threat systems to understand the impact of the
variations that caused the robustness problem.
We figured that the models could tell us which
techniques were more robust (not affected by
‘‘round-to-round’’ variations).
Because of the implications of our findings,
Lt Gen Leaf asked us to brief dozens of general
officers, admirals, and all kinds of Senior Exec-
utive Service (SES) individuals and industry
personnel, including members of the Air Force
SAB. We briefed Corona (an Air Force general
officers forum), the JCS Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), the Director of Oper-
ational Test and Evaluation, the OSD Acquisi-
tion Executive, the Commander of TAC (now
ACC, Air Combat Command), the United States
Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) Vice Com-
mander, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of
the Air Force as well as senior military and civil-
ian leaders in the Army and Navy.
Therewere nodisagreements on our findings
from the DoD leadership nor from the technical
community. However, it involved considerable
M&S, beyond that normally used by an opera-
tional test agency. It required the cooperation of
many organizations across the DoD and in in-
dustry; especially the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). Fortunately, there were many
people in leadership and technical management
positions who quickly understood the problem
and wanted a rapid solution. Key individuals
included Dr. Bill Lummus at the Missile and
Space Intelligence Agency, Stassi Cramm and
Rob Dunn at Edwards AFB, Jim Oliver at the
Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, and Jerry
Palon at Lockheed Fort Worth. There were
dozens of others as well.
The overall strategy, as supported by Air
Force leadership and approved by the SAB,
was to use computer models of threat systems
for the evaluation of robustness and improve-
ment of ECM techniques. Those models would
be developed by the Service intelligence agen-
cies, consistent with their responsibilities of pro-
viding intelligence products. Instead of a pile
of intelligence documents, their primary product
would be models of threat systems that could be
used by all test ranges and hybrid simulation fa-
cilities, as well as other applications.
The implementation of that concept is
a story for another time. The point is that the in-
fluence Lt Gen Leaf hadwas evident in address-
ing this T&E issue. Lt Gen Howard Leaf was
truly a legend. Everyone who worked with, or
for, Lt Gen Leaf has similar stories of his insight
and influence. There is not a single one of us
who doesnt refer to that era as ‘‘the good old
days.’’
Greg Keethler: The ‘‘story for another time’’—
does that have to do with the Joint Modeling
and Simulation System (JMASS) and the Joint
Warfare System (JWARS)? Could you go ahead
and tell us the story?
Marion Williams: Yes, it involved JMASS. As
I said, we had problems with EW and concerns
about the fact that some ECM techniques
worked and some didnt, depending on factors
such as manufacturing tolerances in threat com-
ponents or time from last calibration. There was
no way we could test against several threat sys-
tems of the same type to evaluate ECM tech-
nique ‘‘robustness.’’ The only reasonable way
to attack the problem was to develop models
of the threat systems, simulate system varia-
tions, and use the model to assess whether the
ECM techniques would work against all poten-
tial variations.
JMASS was a modeling technique and an
architecture that could be used to mathemati-
cally represent a threat system, as well as blue
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aircraft and ECM techniques. We thought it was
ideally suited to address the ECM technique ro-
bustness issue. To prove the point, we asked for
and received several million dollars from OSD
to work with the intelligence agencies to de-
velop an engineering model of a specific threat
system and use the model in our ECM testing.
Lt Gen Leaf asked the SAB to review the process
we used as well as example problems where we
demonstrated JMASS in tactical engagements. If
we could prove that JMASS was valid in dem-
onstrating ECM effectiveness, then we would
recommend developing JMASS models for
a range of threat systems and use those models
to supplement open air testing.
The SAB concurred in the use of JMASS, but
in Lt Gen Leafs usual mode, he asked us to brief
a long list of general and flag officers in the three
Services, as well as OSD leaders, to make sure
wehadntmissed something.Wedidnt encounter
any technical issues, but therewere some political
issues since we were recommending processes
and models that were different from those being
used by the Services at the time.
Greg Keethler: Was that where the threat
models would be standardized and therewould
be a single threat model?
Marion Williams: Yes, it was assumed that
we could develop a model of each threat system
(such as the SA-8) that could be used for a range
of applications across the Services. We met with
the Army and Navy, primarily the Naval Re-
search Lab (NRL), to get them to adopt that phi-
losophy so they would use those models.
Then, at Lt Gen Leafs direction, we talked
to the DIA about getting funding for the threat
models. The DIA director said that they could
not fund model development, but would fund
themaintenance of themodels, includingmodel
updates. The Air Force agreed to fund model
development, and established a program ele-
ment for that purpose.
Greg Keethler: You used JMASS for that?
Marion Williams: Yes, we used JMASS as the
architecture. The concept was to get the appro-
priate scientific and technical intelligence center
to develop threat models, the program offices to
develop blue models, and develop common
models for atmospheric and terrain effects—all
in JMASS, which used common methodology,
primarily MATLAB and Simulink. Lt Gen Leaf
owned the program element for JMASS. He
wanted to use that architecture since it was al-
ready being developed. We met with Air Force,
Army, and Navy test ranges and hardware-in-
the-loop (HWIL) facilities to get them to use
the JMASS threat models. For example, the fly-
out model for the SA-8 developed to evaluate
ECM technique robustness could be used on
the Nellis and China Lake test ranges as well
as the Air Force Electronic Warfare Environ-
mental Simulator (AFEWES) and other HWIL
facilities. When a threat system changed, the
fly-out model would be modified by the cogni-
zant intelligence agency and ‘‘plugged-in’’ at
the different test ranges and HWIL facilities.
Those facilities developed ‘‘cradles’’ to accept
the common JMASS fly-out models.
It was a great concept. Otherwise, each test
range and HWIL facility would have different
configurations of the same threat system, re-
quiring the intel agencies to provide updates
to each one individually. With the common
model concept, the intel agency could make
one modification and plug it into the different
test or HWIL applications.
Bob Sheldon: What was the timeframe for
that JMASS work?
Marion Williams: It was in the 1990s, when
Lt Gen Leaf was in the Pentagon as AF/TE.
JMASS was initiated as an OT&E tool, but had
a broad range of applications as long as the
users adopted the JMASS architecture. The ba-
sic idea partially came about because Lt Gen
Leaf found that, for any specific threat system,
hundreds of threat models were being devel-
oped by different Service test agencies and
hardware contractors. Lt Gen Leaf would often
ask why each organization needed its own
model of the same threat since the threat didnt
care if it was engaging an Air Force aircraft or
a Navy aircraft or an Army helicopter.
The JMASS concept was valid; the primary
issue was that it was designed to solve the nar-
row problem of T&E of EW: building threat
models, correlating the models with threat hard-
ware, then evaluating whether ECM techniques
used against those threats would be effective.
However, some people in DoD assumed JMASS
could also serve as the engagement-level model
for all applications, supplementing the Joint
Simulation System (JSIMS) as the trainingmodel
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and JWARS as the campaign model. The man-
agement of JMASS also became an issue. The
intel customers, those building threat models in
the JMASS architecture, faced continuing
changes in the JMASS architecture as they tried
to develop compatible models.
Even without reaching a steady state in
JMASS architecture improvement and model
development, the perception that JMASS was
to be a model for all engagement-level analysis
problems grew.
Greg Keethler: They started mandating it.
Marion Williams: OSD mandated it. You
started seeing pyramid slides in briefings
depicting JWARS, JMASS, and JSIMS as the
integrated M&S solution to any analysis prob-
lem from engineering-level one-on-one mod-
els to campaign level. The implication was that
JMASS engagement-levelmodelswould provide
input to JWARS campaign-level models, with
physics-based models providing inputs to JMASS
where required. In some cases, that was true; for
example, terrain models were used to develop
inputs for terrain effects. However, it was not
a universal process.
Greg Keethler: It was a PowerPoint process.
Marion Williams: For the most part it was
a PowerPoint process. But there are still good
examples of developing and using common
models, as long as analysts recognize that they
have to ensure that the model is appropriate
for their specific application: the accreditation
part of VV&A. Remember ESAMS (Enhanced
Surface-to-Air Missile Simulation)?
Greg Keethler: Yes.
Marion Williams: The DoD and contractors
still use ESAMSmodels, developed by SamBaty
in the early 1980s. They were good functional
threat models used by several test range and
HWIL facilities. We used ESAMS models for
the B-2 when AFOTEC first got involved in clas-
sified programs. One of the big B-2 issues was
survivability; something you can rarely address
in operational field testing. We knew M&S
would have to be a big player.
I went to Northrop to see how survivability
requirements were developed, and how they
used M&S in their design studies. If we knew
what factors made the B-2 ‘‘highly survivable,’’
we would have a better idea about how to test
those factors in OT&E. Maybe we could even
use some of their models in test planning. I
asked if they used models, and if we could use
them. They said, ‘‘Yes, we use models and no,
you cant have them because you didnt pay
for them in the first place. And, even if we could
give them to you, the people who used the
models havemoved on sowe dont have anyone
with the expertise to explain the models and to
train you in their use.’’
We decided that we would build our own
M&S capability using ESAMS as threat models
in an integrated architecture to evaluate B-2 sur-
vivability. We talked to the operational user, the
Strategic Air Command (SAC, which later be-
came STRATCOM [Strategic Command]), to
get their okay. They agreed with the proposal,
and alsowantedAFOTEC to help them in build-
ing M&S tools for evaluating employment
options, such as penetration route planning.
They gave AFOTEC about $10 million to build
a computer simulation of the B-2 engagements
to support OT&E and also support their opera-
tional employment assessments.
Bob Sheldon: When was that?
Marion Williams: I think it was in the late
1980s. It was before the B-2 was even acknowl-
edged as a program. At that time, we werent
even allowed to talk about the B-2. Our testers
would have to go to locations under a guise of
some other program because we couldnt talk
about what we were really doing.
To evaluate B-2 survivability, the Special
Test Directorate at AFOTEC developed a ‘‘cra-
dle’’ that would take different threat models,
such as ESAMS, to examine B-2 penetration of
an integrated air defense system (IADS), where
the B-2 was represented by those characteristics
that would affect survivability, such as radar
cross section (RCS). The cradle would essen-
tially coordinate all the simulated actions of
the B-2 and the threat systems as the aircraft
penetrated the IADS.
Bob Sheldon: You had a B-2 RCS model?
Marion Williams: Yes, along with flight
profiles and environmental factors such as ter-
rain. ESAMS provided the surface-to-air threat
models.
Greg Keethler:Whowrote the programs? The
models?
Marion Williams: The AFOTEC contractor de-
veloped the cradle that accommodated existing
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ESAMS models as well as the B-2 flight profiles,
RCS, and other factors.
Greg Keethler:Was it a det or was it the oper-
ations analysis organization?
Marion Williams: It was the Special Test
Directorate.
After completing the simulation and con-
ducting field tests with the B-2, we had a two-
part briefing on the results for participants and
other interested agencies. The morning session
was devoted to the field test results—one B-2
vs. threat simulators on the test range, with
the afternoon session to discuss the model
results—penetration of an IADS.
We had a huge crowd for the test results, but
whenwe talked about themodel results,most of
them left. They wanted to know how well the
B-2 performed; there was less interest in how
the model said the B-2 performed.
However, it got AFOTEC involved in clas-
sified programs, many of them involving low
observable (LO) programs. LOwas a new tech-
nology to the testers, so we went to MIT Lin-
coln Laboratory and asked them to provide
some training in LO technology. They were the
experts in the field; we figured that we needed
some basic training on the principles in order
to conduct efficient OT&E programs. Lincoln
Laboratory set up a course at no cost to us.
We sent a test team of about 20 or 30 people to
Boston for special training.
Greg Keethler: I know there were some unique
tests, nontraditional things like the AMRAAM
operational utility evaluation (OUE) thatAFOTEC
got into. What were your feelings on those kinds
of things?
Marion Williams: OUEs were nontraditional
but useful efforts to assess the potential utility of
new systems such as the AMRAAM. Initially
there was a concern about AFOTEC conducting
OUEs because it didnt involve real testing; it
was a simulation to demonstrate the utility of
AMRAAM characteristics: Can we use a launch-
and-leave weapon; can the pilot handle the
workload; and would the AMRAAM be more
effective than current air-to-air weapons? It
wasnt a test of the AMRAAM, but an assess-
ment of the concept to assist in the decision
onwhether to build the AMRAAM. It was some-
thing unique to AFOTEC, and not without con-
troversy since it really wasnt a test.
Greg Keethler: And Congress put a condition
that we answer those questions before they
would fund it.
Marion Williams: Thats right. We used the
contractors St. Louis dome facility to do the first
AFOTEC OUE: evaluating what the AMRAAM
could do by putting the design characteristics of
the AMRAAM in a simulation to see if the pilot
could take advantage of its new capabilities and
improve air-to-air intercepts. That effort, with
Capt Greg Keethler as the analyst, proved the
idea of an OUE to understand something about
a new system before it was available for OT&E.
There were several OUEs conducted on com-
plex systems after that. It initiated the idea of
doing more analysis before having hardware
for OT&E.
The Air Force approach to OT&E evolved
over the history of AFOTEC. When AFOTEC
(previously AFTEC) first started, we would be
told of a program requiring OT&E about six
months before the report was due. We didnt
do a lot of long-term planning. As programs
got more complex, we knew that we needed to
start doing earlier planning, which meant get-
ting involved in a program much earlier. We
started doing early operational assessments
(EOAs), operational assessments (OAs), and
OUEs.
We called it ‘‘evaluation using other peoples
data.’’ You look at the concept of the system and
what happened in contractor testing and Air
Force developmental testing to identify, from
an operational standpoint, things that could
cause problems in operational employment.
One of the classic examples was a battery to be
installed under the ejection seat in one of the air-
planes scheduled for OT&E, which required
that the ejection seat be removed in order to
change the battery. The AFOTEC maintenance
group looked at the design and pointed out
the need to relocate the battery to speed up the
maintenance process. This was done before de-
sign was finalized.
It was the maintenance people, the chiefs
and airmen, who would point out problems so
the design could be changed before the system
was put into production. A panel with screw
fastenerswas in the design for one aircraft, where
the panel had to be removed and replaced for
quick turnaround. The maintainability operators
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recommended using quick release fasteners in-
stead of screw fasteners ‘‘to get the panel off
and on quicker.’’ It was a simple fix to increase
sortie rate that would require major changes if
discovered during production. It was a different
way to look at the responsibilities of an OT&E
organization.
Greg Keethler: Any other unique test chal-
lenges that come to mind?
Marion Williams: Oh yes. One of the big is-
sues on the F-22 was the ‘‘twice as effective as
the F-15’’ criteria established by OSD. The F-22
COEA (cost and operational effectiveness anal-
ysis) used to help justify the F-22, indicated that
it would be ‘‘X times’’ more effective than the
F-15. I cant recall what the number was, but it
was used as a rationale for building the F-22.
When it came to developing OT&E criteria
for the F-22, OSD quoted the COEA regarding
being more effective than the F-15 and decided
that the F-22 ought to be at least twice as effec-
tive as the F-15; and demonstrated in the OT&E.
Greg Keethler: What does that mean?
Marion Williams: They didnt define what
was meant by ‘‘twice as effective’’ but we as-
sumed it must mean kill ratio (also referred to
as loss exchange ratio—red losses divided by
blue losses) because thats what the COEAused.
Greg Keethler: And the F-15 has a zero de-
nominator for that, right?
Marion Williams: Or at least close to it. Until
that time, the purpose of OT&Ewas primarily to
determine whether the system was ‘‘effective
and suitable’’ in a realistic test environment. Us-
ing kill ratio as anMOEwas something new.We
went to RAND, the agency responsible for the
F-22 COEA, to see if there were particular fac-
tors (such as detection range) that drove the dif-
ference in effectiveness between the F-22 and
the F-15. We never found the magic bullet, and
OSD required that the twice as effective criteria
be demonstrated in the OT&E. That required
a new level of analysis for a field test, including
things like real-time kill removal.
AFOTEC spent about $5 million for simula-
tions of the F-15 and F-22 against common threats
at Northrups Phantom Works to better under-
stand how to evaluate kill ratio in a field test.
Greg Keethler: You used real airplanes?
Marion Williams: Yes, in the OT&E. We had
to keep the then-current F-15 available to test
against the F-22. In addition, the acquisition lan-
guage required that the test be conducted ‘‘on
a level playing field’’—we couldnt give the
F-22 credit for something the F-15 couldnt do.
It was a tough test, but comparing a new
systems capability to an existing capability is
a good way to measure increase in capability.
Dr. Seglie, the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) Science Advisor, pushed
for comparison testing for all OT&E. However,
the Air Force decided that the cost of baseline
testing was more than they could afford; essen-
tially doubling the cost of OT&E.
Bob Sheldon: What are your thoughts on
small sample size tests, especially with respect
to live fire testing? How did you address that?
Marion Williams: Small sample size is an
inherent problem in OT&E. We tried different
approaches to mitigate the problem of small
sample size, including using Bayesian statis-
tics to help analyze reliability. With Bayes the-
ory we could combine component test results
(from contractor or development testing) with
system level data fromOT&E to predict weapon
system operational reliability.
The problem is the same as we found at JTF
II; classical statisticians and Bayesians dont
agree. Even the definition of confidence limits
is different in the classical statistics community
and the Bayesian community. We went to the
OSR (Air Force Office of Scientific Research) to
get their help in applying Bayesian statistics.
However, we could never get agreement on
the use of Bayesian statistics, so we didnt use
confidence bounds in our briefings very often
because classical confidence bounds get very
wide with small sample sizes. Plus, some gen-
eral officers dont resonate with confidence
bounds.
Greg Keethler: Their eyes glaze over.
MarionWilliams: Thats right. Thatswhywe
used colors to portray ratings: Blue for great;
Green for OK; and Red for not satisfactory.
However, that often goes too far, and sometimes
the audience doesnt really grasp the uncer-
tainties in the conclusions.
There was a study by the National Research
Council on OT&E and statistics sponsored by
DOT&E when Tom Christie was the Director
with a bunch of us from the operational test agen-
cies working with them for about six months.
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They insisted that testers explain test results in
detail to the decisionmakers, including test un-
certainties.We tried to explain that a briefer has
30minutes to explain the results of testing a bil-
lion dollar system; there just isnt enough time
to go into that level of detail.
Greg Keethler:What major changes have you
seen over the years in methodologies, and how
they are applied?
Marion Williams: There have been major ad-
vances, especially in computational capability.
However, I dont think we have improved a lot
in trying to tie actual data back into the models.
We need to do better in pretest prediction and
posttest correlation using models. We have tons
of opportunity to do that, but it was always
a secondary objective. It falls through the crack
because it doesnt have a short-term payoff.
The use of M&S is different for different ap-
plications. In analysis, models provide insight
into whether option A is better than option B.
In T&E—especially OT&E—the question is
more absolute: how well will system Z be able
to accomplish mission X? We are interested in
how well that system can accomplish its mis-
sion; not how well the model of the system
can accomplish a mission. Models can, how-
ever, help plan more efficient tests and provide
more complete analysis by investigating areas
not possible in tests. Models help with the in-
sight to allow more efficient testing and more
complete analysis. However, the use of M&S
in T&E—especially constructive models—is
limited because most models arent designed
with a test application in mind. And most of
the time, the testers dont have the time or the
funding to make models more applicable to
their test applications. Until system models
are developed with the total acquisition pro-
cess in mind—including the T&E part—T&E
applications of models will continue to be frag-
mented and not very efficient. At some point
in time, we ought to be able to use models for
evaluation in areas where there is low risk,
and then focus testing in areas where there is
high risk.
Greg Keethler: Are you concerned about the
tendency to focus on M&S?
Marion Williams: Yes. M&S is a tool and you
can sometimes pick the wrong tool. Stassi
Cramm, when she worked at the 412th Test
Wing/EW, had a favorite saying: ‘‘A fool with
a tool is still a fool.’’
Models have to be tailored for the applica-
tion since there are no universally valid models.
Analysts have to decide what is important, then
select a model—or models—that correctly rep-
resents those important parts of the real world.
In the Air Defense Modeling and Simulation
(ADMAS) workshop, we had to understand
what aspects of the real world were important
for each application. For radio frequency (RF)
detection, the RCS of the target must be ade-
quately represented; and the requirement for
modeling the RCS is different for semi-active
missiles than for command-guided missiles.
Each important factor had to be identified, then
the representation of that feature in the model
assessed. Analysis is the key.
Greg Keethler: As Clay Thomas used to say,
‘‘Big A, and little M&S.’’ I remember you spent
a lot of time on M&S issues associated with the
B-1 avionics system.
Marion Williams: That was because when Lt
Gen Leaf was AFOTEC Commander he be-
lieved thatM&S should be a tool to help address
complex testing issues. As T&E became more
complicated, issues came up that couldnt be
addressed solely by field testing and he saw
M&S as a solution to addressing some of those
issues. One of the major test programs at the
time was the B-1B. The Air Force had developed
the ALQ-161 Defensive Avionics System for the
B-1, but it wasnt very effective. Lt Gen Leaf said
that each Service had systems that turned out
to be less effective or less suitable than re-
quired. The B-1B ALQ-161 was the Air Forces
program, the Navy had the A-12, and the Army
had Sergeant York. Those programs resulted in
more attention to OT&E and more pressure to
make sure weapons worked properly when
deployed.
AFOTEC was to test the B-1B Defensive
System Upgrade to replace the original ALQ-161,
and Lt Gen Leaf firmly told us that we were go-
ing to make sure it was tested completely, and
ensure that it was an effective system. He saw
M&S as a tool for that OT&E.
Greg Keethler:Wewere talking offline yester-
day about how that was touted as the way to
save time on the F-35 development. All this
simulation-based development would save time
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on the testing and it hasnt reallyworked out that
way.
Marion Williams: In my opinion it really
hasnt, because assumptions that were made in
the model often arent correct. We use models
to make acquisition more efficient, but some-
times the models are wrong, and changes have
to be made to systems already through the pro-
duction line at a much greater cost than if those
problems had been discovered through testing
and fixed before production.
Greg Keethler: You have to slow down the
production line.
MarionWilliams:Wehave to slow down pro-
duction, make fixes, and maybe delay deploy-
ment. We are finding that simulation is a really
good tool for better understanding a problem.
However, to make acquisition more effective,
we want to use models for answers that will
speed up acquisition. We have moved from
models to gain insight to models that give an-
swers on how well a system will work in com-
bat. We need to be careful; models are helpful
in understanding the bounds of our conclu-
sions—that is, if we test at a certain altitude,
models can help understandwhether those con-
clusions would be valid at different altitudes,
and can point out where additional testing is
necessary.
However, in some cases field testing isnt
feasible, such as firing real weapons at real air-
planes. Simulation can fill the gap of knowledge
in areas such as probability of kill—using a
model to simulate the trajectory of a missile to
its target and the damage that would occur if
it hit the target.
But relying on models for test conclusions
has risk. Credible VV&A can greatly mitigate
the risk, but we arent very good at doing
VV&A inOT&E because few testers have the ex-
pertise, time, or funding to do it properly.
Greg Keethler: Do you see the pendulum
coming back the other way, given whats hap-
pened with the F-35?
Marion Williams: I dont think everyone rec-
ognizes the problem yet.
Greg Keethler: So they havent connected the
dots. The fact that we have to slow down pro-
duction to do more testing, they havent con-
nected that?
Marion Williams: Not yet.
Greg Keethler:Weworked together in the late
1990s when the pressure was huge on simula-
tion-based acquisition. I remember you as one
of the very few, if not the only person at a senior
level that said, ‘‘Im not so sure this is a great
idea for OT&E.’’ Did you find it difficult to take
that position and did you get a lot of pressure to
back off of that?
Marion Williams: Not really. Most people
understood the risk. When Dr. Ernest Seglie
was science advisor at DOT&E, we had a lot of
conversations on how to use models. Ernie
was not a proponent of models; he liked the
quote that ‘‘all models are wrong; some are use-
ful.’’ He was also a proponent of using hard
data to decide if a new system was better than
the system it replaced by testing the new system
‘‘side by side’’ with the old system. Models are
less useful in those situations.
Greg Keethler: Youve got to test the baseline.
Marion Williams: Thats right. However, you
would need side-by-side testing, which practi-
cally doubles the cost of a test. Or you have to
use existing data on the old system to compare
to test data on the new system. Using old test
data seldom works because the conditions
and assumptions in the original test are sel-
dom captured and archived. It isnt that it cant
be done; it is just that few organizations do it
well.
On the other hand, if we could buildmodels
that were validated with test data, andmaintain
those models, they could be used to compare
the new system with the old system. That was
often a topic of conversation related to baseline
testing, but it was never realistically examined.
However, models need to be validated with test
data, which is seldom accomplished.
AFOTEC often volunteered to gather test
data for model validation if we had a customer.
We fired a number of missiles against a drone
and gathered data on missile trajectory, as well
as other data. We sent messages out looking
for anyone interested in the data for validation
of models of the systems being tested. We even
sent the missiles to MSIC (Missile and Space In-
telligence Center) to do a characterization, along
with weight and balance measurements to un-
derstand the variations. We had some good case
studies to not only evaluate missile perfor-
mance, but also compare flight test results with
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model results. However, we didnt get any
takers for the data outside of AFOTEC.
Therewere a number of areaswherewe had
perplexing T&E problems that went beyond
normal field testing. Examples included the
large target problem where we could only test
our missiles against small drone targets with
no way to extrapolate to a bomber size target
where glint and scintillation are more signifi-
cant. We had an airplane with a mile-long trail-
ing wire antenna that could affect aircraft
survivability in case of an EMP with no way to
do a realistic test. We needed to estimate the ef-
fect of sunspots on an over-the-horizon radar
when we could only test during periods of
low sunspot activity. We needed a way to eval-
uate the impact of manufacturing tolerances
on ECM techniques against enemy missiles;
and there were dozens of similar problems.
Each of those problems could only be addressed
through the use of M&S to supplement field
testing.
Lt Gen Leaf, when he was AFOTEC Com-
mander and later Director of the Air Force Test
and Evaluation office, always tried to get coop-
eration with the other Services and industry in
figuring out how to address these tough prob-
lems. He would call some of us into his office
and say ‘‘we have a problem; figure out how
to solve it.’’ Those were exciting times. We
would try to find the experts, get together to dis-
cuss the problem, brainstorm solutions, and
take them back to Lt Gen Leaf. He would nor-
mally send us to the experts, like Lt Gen Glenn
Kent, Norm Augustine, Harold Smith, the Air
Force Chief Scientist, and as many others as he
could think of, so they could decide if we had
a good solution.
Bob Sheldon: You referred to Lt Gen Leaf and
Lt Gen Kent. You knew both of them well—any
further thoughts about their impact?
Marion Williams: I could go on for hours
talking about ‘‘the good old days’’ with Lt Gen
Leaf and Lt Gen Kent. They were great leaders
and I considered both my mentors and critics.
Its hard to think of all the things that they
taught me. Lt Gen Leaf had a habit of asking
some really tough questions, such as, ‘‘How
dowe evaluate ECM?’’ or ‘‘How dowe evaluate
nuclear weapon effects in operational testing?’’
He didnt mind if we didnt have an immediate
answer, but he expected an answer in a very
short period of time. When he did get an an-
swer, he usually insisted that we brief the ex-
perts in the field (and he knew most of them)
to make sure we didnt get something wrong.
With contacts throughMORS, it was always
possible to take advantage of the expertise of
a lot of individuals. Over the years I called
Tom Allen or Natalie Crawford with, ‘‘Ive got
a problem that Lt Gen Leaf wants solved. Can
I come and talk to you?’’ With Lt Gen Leaf, I
had the ability to go where I wanted to and talk
to anyone and try to solve the problem—as long
as I could come back with some kind collective
agreement on an answer.
Lt Gen Kent was a person that you did not
want to formally brief unless absolutely neces-
sary. To Lt Gen Kent, imprecise language was
as bad as sloppy mathematics. We would spend
hours trying to explain to him what the words
on our slides really meant and what our objec-
tive really was. I know that a 30-minute briefing
one time lasted five hours with Lt Gen Kent be-
cause he kept asking questions. The benefit was
that by the time that you finished the discussion,
you understood what you were saying better
than you did when you started out.
The story goes that at one time Lt Gen Kent
was being briefed and one particular slide gave
him problems; he kept asking the briefer more
andmore questions. And the briefer got in more
and more trouble. Finally, Lt Gen Kent went to
the projector and picked up the viewgraph,
stuck a pencil through it, and said, ‘‘You will
never use that slide again.’’ [Laughter]
He was a tiger in receiving briefings. In
a briefing on the Wild Weasel program where
Lt Gen Kent was a reviewer, Lt Gen Leaf asked
how we were going to do operational testing.
One of the questions we were trying to ad-
dress was, ‘‘How effective is the Wild Weasel
against enemy radars?’’ Lt Gen Kent said,
‘‘The broader question is Can you suppress en-
emy radars just due to the threat of the Wild
Weasel? I want to quantify that as well.’’
So we started looking into some computer
models like TACOS (Tactical Air Defense Com-
puter Operational Simulation). Lt Gen Kent
hated computer models; he preferred to derive
simple equations for complex problems. He
came out to Albuquerque one time after asking
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the question on Wild Weasel effectiveness and
gave me a single sheet of paper where he had
listed the factors that would go into suppression
of enemy air defenses in an ‘‘e to the minus x’’
equation. He said ‘‘you can solve it with this;
but throw away your computer models and
think about the problem instead of using brute
force.’’
Bob Sheldon: Your comment about Norm
Augustine was the first time Ive heard that he
talked to analysts or testers. What was his rela-
tionship with the test community?
Marion Williams: He was on the OT&E Ad-
visory Group that Lt Gen Leaf put together.
Greg Keethler: How did he get put on there?
Marion Williams: Lt Gen Leaf asked Augus-
tine to be on his advisory group because he had
a lot of respect for him. Norm came to every
meeting and we enjoyed the interchanges.
Because of Lt Gen Leafs influence we had
what I considered a collection of great minds—
Leaf, Kent, Augustine, Hal Smith, the current
Air Force Chief Scientist, and others.
Lt Gen Leaf used to say therewere three rea-
sons he brought these people in. First, it would
make us think through our answers in order to
explain our plan to the group. That would help
us identify weak areas. Second, they were smart
enough to identify weak points or better solu-
tions and help us improve our plan. Third, we
had a group of respected, high-level personnel
that would give credibility when we briefed
the Pentagon.
Bob Sheldon: When did he put that panel
together?
Marion Williams: About 1977 when Lt Gen
Leaf was AFOTEC Commander. He was the
longest serving Commander at AFOTEC.
Bob Sheldon: So Augustine had a pretty big
reputation at that point.
MarionWilliams: Yes, he did. Augustine was
on the SAB at the time Lt Gen Leaf formed his
OTEAG (Operational Test and Evaluation Advi-
sory Group). He also picked others from the
SAB such as Jasper Welch.
Bob Sheldon: Did you ever interact with
Dr. Bob Ball from NPS (Naval Postgraduate
School) regarding aircraft combat survivability?
Marion Williams: Yes. We had a lot of inter-
face with Dr. Ball when the JTCG (Joint Techni-
cal Coordinating Group) was formed within
OSD. We were looking at aircraft survivability
at the time because that was one of the areas
where we really had technical problems. In
OT&E of systems employing ECM, the MOE
in the requirement documents was usually re-
duction in lethality (RIL). Essentially, if an en-
emy missile came within a lethal radius of the
airplane, it assumed that it could domajor dam-
age. The requirement was that the ECM being
used to defeat that missile ought to reduce the
number of missiles that came within that lethal
radius by 20 percent.
If you look at it from the standpoint of
mathematics, it essentially says that if I fly in
an engagement zone and get hit 10 times with-
out ECM and only eight hits when using
ECM, I pass the requirement. However, it really
doesnt prove that the aircraft would survive.
We tried to show that it wasnt a very goodmea-
sure for the B-1 and really needed to address
aircraft survivability. Bob was—and probably
still is—the expert in survivability, so he was
a big help.
Aircraft survivability is a complex issue; es-
pecially in operational testing. There are many
test limitations that leave voids that have to be
filled with hybrid and digital simulation. When
Lt Gen Leaf started asking about B-1B surviv-
ability, especially improvement in survivability
using ECM,we started looking intowhat test as-
sets and aircraft data would be needed. We
knew that testing a threat missile engagement
with the B-1B would have to be accomplished
with HWIL simulation; we had done similar
testing for the E-2B at the Air Force Electronic
Warfare Environmental Simulator (AFEWES)
in Fort Worth. It isnt feasible to fire a real mis-
sile against a real airplane in flight, so AFEWES
testing was necessary. One area where we
needed data that seems simple but is in reality
very complicated is RCS. Since the threat of inter-
est was a semi-active missile, we needed bistatic
RCS data since the threat transmitting radar is
at a different location than the receiving radar.
The angle between the two is the bistatic angle.
Getting bistatic radar data is expensive since
we needed radar returns for multiple geometries
at multiple bistatic angles.
There are different ways that you can do
that. There is a bistatic measurement facility at
Holloman but the cost and complexity of getting
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data on a B-1 at Holloman made it not a feasible
solution. There are also approximations to
bistatic returns.
AFOTEC, led by Dr. Frank Gray, used the
AFEWES HWIL simulation where some func-
tions are simulated with software, such as aero-
dynamics and flight control, coupled with real
missile seekers. B-1B radar return was simu-
lated using RCS data along with vulnerability
data to allow Pk (probability of kill) calcula-
tions. Studies like that are constantly needed
to better understand the best way to address
M&S and T&E issues.
Greg Keethler: Can you give us any other in-
teresting stories about M&S issues?
Marion Williams: JTF II adopted a nontradi-
tional approach to T&E—primarily based on
a philosophy developed by Charlie Jacobs, the
chief civilian scientist. That philosophywas that
the purpose of testing should be to validate
models, with the models being used for evalua-
tion. He believed that test results were too lim-
ited to be used as the basis for evaluation.
Models were used to synthesize the test results
to allow analysis beyond the bounds of the test.
That philosophy was revolutionary at the time
(1966) although some ‘‘blue ribbon’’ committees
recommended this approach even before ‘‘sim-
ulation-based acquisition.’’ Later, at AFOTEC,
we tried to integrate M&S into operational test-
ing, but not in the same way as JTF II. In JTF II,
the model became the focus of the evaluation.
The purpose of OT&E, on the other hand, is to
ensure that systems work as intended—a differ-
ent perspective. Models are used to gain insight,
not to evaluate how well a system will work in
combat. As models get better, they can be used
more for evaluation instead of insight, but we
dont have a consistent process to ‘‘validate’’
models with test data now, nor do we have the
first-principle or physics-based models that we
need. However, models are much better now
than those we used at STC. The primary model
there was COMO, which stands for Computer
Model.
COMO was developed by Dutch and Brit-
ish engineers and scientists at STC. It was a flex-
ible model that could be made more detailed as
required for the application—simple look-up ta-
bles down to complex algorithms or even phys-
ics-based.We used it on the airfield attack study
for the British and Dutch Air Forces. The Army
got interested in COMO and Dan Willard from
the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the
Army (OR) came to STC to see if it could be ap-
plied to some Army programs.We sent a couple
of scientists from the Hague to Huntsville to
help the Army install and use the model for
studies on the Patriot system.When I came back
to the US to work for AFOTEC, COMOwas still
being used. Jasper Welch, head of AFSAA and
Wilbur Payne, Director at TRAC White Sands
and I talked about a combined effort between
Air Force and Army studies using COMO. Both
believed that we needed cooperative M&S ef-
forts, and we discussed a combined effort to ad-
dress common Air Force and Army issues.
Cooperation would reduce cost and duplica-
tion. Sound familiar?
Greg Keethler: Ive heard that before.
Marion Williams: It never worked. But we
keep trying. Maj Gen Welch and Wilbur Payne
wanted to use COMO to support a Joint Test
and Evaluation program—Electronic Warfare
in Close Air Support (EW/CAS), a four-year,
$100M1 program. Although EW/CAS was
a test program, they recognized that a common
Air Force/Army model could be used in the
evaluation of tactics against surface-to-air mis-
sile system simulators developed to support
EW/CAS. It sounded like an ideal way tomodel
EW engagements: validate the model with test
data, and then use the model in other applica-
tions. There were other joint tests planned that
could also use those models; the model could
become the synthesis of the test results. It
started off really well. However, the models
were more complex than we thought, and
model development slipped beyond the test,
and when we finished the test, the models
werent ready. It didnt work out as well as we
hoped. Even though Wilbur Payne and Jasper
Welch agreed in principle, their own organiza-
tions had their favorite models. Overall the the-
ory was good; the execution was less than
desired. It is a good concept; just hard to do.
Still, it was challenging—getting the right bal-
ance of testing and simulation.
Bob Sheldon: Let me ask a question about
your ‘‘twin’’ in the Army, Marion Bryson. Dur-
ing his oral history interview, he said he was
proud of the fact that his integrity was
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challenged butmaintainedwhenhe killed apro-
gram. One general officer called him on the car-
pet. ‘‘Youve got to do these tests to pass this.’’
But he stood his ground. Hes also proud of
the fact that he calls himself the father of Apache
because he brought that one through the re-
quirements process and through testing. Are
there any particular systems that you feel proud
of where you either killed the program or
helped do a really good test to validate it?
Marion Williams: To the best of my memory
AFOTEC only ‘‘killed’’ one program—the Stra-
tegic Air Command Digital Information Net-
work (SACDIN), which just didnt work in
OT&E. I recall the number of times we had to
draft and redraft the message to SAC with the
conclusion that SACDIN wasnt effective. Lt
Gen Leaf had a rule to send bad news early
and we didnt know how to say it gently.
The reason there were so few is that OT&E
shouldnt kill programs. By the time you go to
OT&E, you have committed 80 percent of the
funds on the program. If you kill it then, youve
got to start all over again. So you dont try to kill
a program in OT&E; you try to identify prob-
lems and make it better. I think that AFOTEC
made a lot of programs better by identifying
things that had to be fixed before they went into
combat.
I worry because I think that the philosophy
of OT&E is changing. The philosophy initially
was, ‘‘Does the system work?’’ We found in
Vietnam and other conflicts that things that
went into the field didnt work, like the old
M-16 rifle, which jammed when it got dirt in
the mechanism. By putting a real system in an
operationally realistic environment with real
operators, many problems can be found and
fixed before the system goes into production
and into combat.
However, we are losing the ‘‘does it work’’
question in an attempt to get to the broader
issues that cant be addressed with field
testing—issues that require simulation and are
often at the operational level. It is essential be-
cause we are in a system-of-systems operational
environment, but it requires more tools and dif-
ferent expertise. OSD has approved a concept
for distributed testing using live, virtual, and
constructive systems. However, we still havent
figured out how to make that type of testing
affordable. We just know that it is cheaper than
field testing as we know it.
However, when it comes to testing of cyber-
security (offensive and defensive cyberwarfare),
distributed LVC (live, virtual, and constructive)
testing is essential, but still difficult.
Greg Keethler: How does OR as a discipline
compare to engineering?
Marion Williams: OR is not a tool like aero-
dynamics; its a bunch of tools you use to try
to solve a problem. However, there seems to
be more focus on the tools than on problem solv-
ing. It should help structure thinking—thinking
about solving an analysis problem or structuring
an OT&E. OR is as much art as it is a science.
You learn the art by experience, by learning
from someone who has done it before, and
from mentors, not just formal education. I still
think that thementoring isnt considered as im-
portant, and case studies dont have enough
emphasis.
Greg Keethler:What do you see as the state of
methods and acceptance ofmilitaryOR today as
compared to times past, and how do you think
we need to improve it?
Marion Williams: It would take some time to
think about that. Im not too sure I even know
the answer. As a profession, its gotten a lot
tougher over the years, because the acquisition
systems are a lot more complex. We are moving
from system platform battles to network-centric
warfare. The analysis tools are getting better be-
cause of computer technology, but we still dont
have tools that help assess howwell systemswork
together in the network-centric environment—the
system-of-systems environment. We cant al-
ways test in that environment because it is too
costly, and there probably isnt enough control
to really understand cause and effect. That
means we have to rely a lot more on M&S (in-
cluding LVC testing) to provide a basis for our
analyses, and, in my opinion, M&S in the DoD
just isnt ready to handle that just yet because
we havent thought through all the problems.
We are still too fragmented. There ought to be
first-principle or physics-based models to sup-
port the functional models we use for engage-
ment analysis, but they rarely exist. We need
a consistent way to correlate model and test
results, but this is seldom a goal in T&E or in
M&S. This isnt to say that M&S isnt being
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effectively used; it is just that successful M&S is
program or test specific, not uniform across pro-
grams and processes. And making sure the
models are ‘‘good enough’’ is a tough task that
we arent equipped to handle just yet.
Greg Keethler:Howhas the acceptance of OR
changed over the years?
Marion Williams: I think its harder now be-
cause the systems aremore complex and the an-
swers arent as clear-cut. It seems that studies in
the past had well-defined assumptions, evalua-
tions, and conclusions. When you listened to
a briefing about a study result, the question that
was being asked was clear and there were obvi-
ous insights from the study that helped deci-
sion-makers make decisions. Maybe that was
because we had to do our own briefings so we
tried to minimize the number of slides, which
meant we had to get to the point fast. At least
it was obvious when a study helpedwith a deci-
sion. Modern studies seem to provide a lot of in-
formation, but it isnt as clear that the studies
lead to a conclusion, or even that the study
helped with the insight that led to a decision.
Many modern briefings have lots of data (and
tons of slides) but it seems harder to keep track
of the questions and the answers. There is no
‘‘thread,’’ as Lt Gen Leaf often commented
about briefings. Again, it may be that studies
have gotten more complex because the nature
of warfare has gotten more complex. If you look
at the number of OR organizations 20 years ago
as compared to now, OR acceptance must have
decreased because the number of OR organiza-
tions has decreased.
Greg Keethler: Are there some OR groups
that do that better than others?
Marion Williams: I dont know that there are
better groups, but any group that makes sure
the question to be addressed is well defined al-
ways has a much better rate of success. I re-
ceived several briefings on studies conducted
for AFOTEC where my reaction was, ‘‘Good
briefing, but you didnt answer the question that
was asked.’’ Sometimes it was, ‘‘I dont have any
idea what you are trying to tell me.’’
Greg Keethler: What advice would you give
to someone who is starting out today in the mil-
itary OR profession?
Marion Williams: Start out as an engineer,
then add OR tools like statistics, simulation,
optimization, and so forth. Engineering helps
with a structured thought process, which is ba-
sic to problem solving. It helps to have military
experience as well.
Greg Keethler: How could the training and
education of OR analysts be improved?
Marion Williams: We teach the tools; we are
lacking in the applications in problem solving.
In T&E, defining a ‘‘test concept’’—the basic
structure of a test and the evaluation of the test
data—requires as much art as science. Test de-
sign, statistical analysis, simulation, and other
tools are the elements, but putting them to-
gether to define the overall test concept defines
a good test program.
Greg Keethler: From your perspective, what
are themost important issues facing themilitary
OR profession today, andwhat needs to be done
about them, and in particular, what can MORS
do about them?
Marion Williams: The main issue is making
OR relevant to theDoD,whichmeans providing
analyses that help decision makers make deci-
sions. The analysts need to be able to (1) reduce
lots of work into short, meaningful results that
clearly provide the information for decisions;
(2) ensure that questions are well defined before
trying to answer them; and (3) provide objective
results.
MORS can help, as it always has, in bring-
ing people together for education and training,
and for communication, and for peer review.
Working groups need to be discussions, not lec-
tures—a place to expose your assumptions and
analysis methodology so your study or test or
analysis can be improved. Like OR, the secret
is getting people with different backgrounds
and different expertise together to attack a prob-
lem. General sessions are where the analysts
learn about DoD expectations from key leaders;
working groups are where they argue about
techniques and results.
MORS can help train analysts to first define
the problem before starting to solve it. I talked to
a man who was one of the designers of the B-2
bomber; he was working on reducing the IR sig-
nature. He said he sat down and thought about
the problem for eight days before he put pen to
paper. We sometimes just dive into a problem
without thinking it through ahead of time. That
can lead to selecting the wrong OR tool. Dr. Sam
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Stearns, one of my early mentors, would help
me with my homework when I was in graduate
school at UNM. I would try to find an equation
that matched the problem, but Sam always
wanted me to start with F ¼ ma and derive the
equation I needed. He always started with the
basics. In OR, we need to learn to start with
the basics and think the problem through before
starting to solve it.
MORS has access to awealth of experienced
OR analysts—people who have been there and
done that. The junior/senior analysts forum
at MORSS is a great idea. We need to learn
from people like Glenn Kent, Walt Hollis, E.B.
Vandiver, and others that I need to include but
am afraid I would miss someone. If I were a
young analyst, I would offer to go to work for
someone like Glenn Kent for minimum wage
just for the opportunity to learn from him and
to listen to his stories about his early days; even
about his experience as a basketball coach. Lt
Gen Kent and his peers have, or did have, the
expertise and experience we need to teach us
how to be good OR analysts.
I cant think of anything that we havent
covered, except to re-emphasize the need to
mentor and be mentored. Of all my memories
in MORS, among the best were dinners with
the great thinkers in OR. We have already lost
some of the great ones like Glenn Kent, Wilbur
Payne, and Clay Thomas. We need to take ad-
vantage of those still with us.
Greg Keethler: We havent touched on men-
torship. I consider you one of my primary men-
tors as I was coming up as a young analyst. I
think a lot of people do—for example, John
Andrew and Suzanne Beers. Any observations
you want to make about that?
Marion Williams: I think there were a lot of
people—Suzanne, John, you, and others who
had a very innovative approach to analysis.
Suzanne Beers was a very sharp individual that
George Harrison and I sent back to school to get
a PhD. Suzanneworked for me as a Captain, but
wanted to go toMIT for a PhDdegree.However,
Maj Gen Harrison and I had helped establish
a program in test and evaluation at Georgia
Tech, and thought Suzanne would be an ideal
candidate for that program. After a lot of
persuading, Suzanne agreed to go to Georgia
Tech rather than MIT. Maj Gen Harrison also
arranged to have her assigned back to AFOTEC
after graduation. After returning to AFOTEC,
followed by other assignments, she was pro-
moted to Colonel and assigned as the Com-
mander of the AFOTEC Detachment in
Colorado Springs.
There were others like Stassi Cramm. Stassi
worked at Edwards AFB but was a major asset
in helping plan and execute OT&E at the West-
ern Test Range. She worked with AFOTEC in
developing and implementing new test con-
cepts, as well as major simulation efforts such
as JMASS. Rob Dunn also worked with Stassi
on M&S and T&E.
Pat Sanders, like Suzanne and Stassi, was
a major player in instituting M&S in OT&E at
AFOTEC. Pat later became an SES in OSD and
thenMissile Defense Agency Executive Director.
I wouldnt claim to be a mentor of any of
them; I probably learned more from them than
they did from me.
There were also others who were instru-
mental in helping me at AFOTEC, including
captains and majors too numerous to name. I
was especially grateful to Dr. Frank Gray and
Mike Dieckhoff; my deputies during the later
stages of my career at AFOTEC, as well as the
13 general officers I worked for.
I guess if I had to pick an ending to my oral
history, it would be something to do with the
people and organizations I was privileged to
work with, and the extraordinary cooperation
among different organizations in the Services,
in OSD and in industry. It would also have
something to do with lessons learned, or maybe
lessons not learned. There were great opportu-
nities to learn from great individuals and great
minds; I only wish I had been smart enough to
listen harder when I had the chance.
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